The  Heart Cases  in Workmen\u27s Compensation: an Analysis and Suggested Solution by Larson, Arthur
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 65 Issue 3 
1967 




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the Workers' Compensation 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Arthur Larson, The "Heart Cases" in Workmen's Compensation: an Analysis and Suggested Solution, 65 
MICH. L. REV. 441 (1967). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE "HEART CASES" IN WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION: AN ANALYSIS AND 
SUGGESTED SOLUTION 
Arthur Larson• 
T HE compensability of heart attacks continues to be probably the most prolific and troublesome problem in workmen's compen-
sation law. 
There is nothing complex about the typical fact situation. A 
worker whose customary duties involve lifting 100-pound sacks from 
a floor onto a platform suffers a heart attack immediately after one 
such exertion. Is this an "injury by accident arising out of and in the 
course of employment"? The range of precipitating events can be 
as broad and as varied as the entire spectrum of exertions or emo-
tional conditions capable of contributing to the onset of a heart 
attack, from walking up a flight of stairs to engaging in a heated 
argument with a supervisor. 
The gravity of this problem within the workmen's compensation 
system is not surprising. Given the dominant position of heart dis-
ease as a source of disability and death, the extent to which work-
men's compensation assumes both medical and income maintenance 
responsibility for the victims of heart disease naturally has a heavy 
bearing on the comprehensiveness, cost, and ultimate direction of 
the system. Obviously if the heart attack is a genuinely work-con-
nected injury, to deny compensation benefits would be a gross viola-
tion of the legislative purpose and of the workman's rights. It is 
equally obvious that, under the coverage clause quoted at the outset, 
compensation cannot be paid for every heart attack which happens 
to make its appearance during working hours. Thus, the task of the 
courts, armed with little more than this generally-worded coverage 
formula, has been to draw the line between the legitimate applica-
tion of the Act and the indiscriminate distribution of compensation 
funds to almost all employed heart victims. 
It is one of the great tragedies of the workmen's compensation 
story that almost all courts, in their perfectly justifiable search for a 
legal barrier that would keep compensation heart liability from 
getting out of hand, have seized upon the wrong component in the 
coverage formula. The words "by accident" or their equivalent were 
pressed into service for this task, ·and they have proved to be a most 
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ill-fitting tool for this function. If the courts had followed the more 
logical course of testing these cases by the causal principle prescribed 
by the words "arising out of the employment," there would still 
have been difficult evidentiary questions of medical causation, but 
we would have been spared the Niagara of intricate and frustrating 
decisions that have struggled with the intellectually unmanageable 
question: When does a heart attack occur by accident? 
I. THE REQUIREMENT OF ACCIDENTAL INJURY 
Since the heart cases rest almost entirely on the "by accident" 
provision in workmen's compensation statutes, we must begin by 
indicating briefly the present posture of statutory law. The require-
ment that the injury be accidental in character has been adopted 
either legislatively or judicially by all but six states.1 The usual 
phrase found in statutes containing the requirement is injury "by 
accident," a phrase taken from the original British Act. This phrase 
occurs in the statutes of thirty states.2 Nine states,8 the District of 
Columbia, and the Longshoremen's Act use the phrase "accidental 
injury." The Ohio Code introduces the "accidental" factor by defin-
ing injury to include "any injury, whether caused by external acci-
dental means or accidental in character and result,"4 while Montana 
and Washington choose different wording, the former preferring 
"from an unexpected cause"5 and the latter "a sudden and tangible 
happening, of a traumatic nature." In three states, Michigan, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming, the basic coverage clause does not contain 
an express accident requirement, but the word "accident" is used 
elsewhere in the statute, usually to fix the beginning of the period 
in which notice of injury must be given or claim must be made. The 
courts of these three states have read "accidental" into the coverage 
1. The six states are California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and 
Texas. Rhode Island deleted the requirement in 1949. R.I. Laws 1949, ch. 2282. 
Minnesota removed the word "accident" in 1953. Minn. Laws 1953, ch. 755, § 2. The 
United States Employees' Compensation Act also omits the requirement. 39 Stat. 742 
(1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 751a (1964). 
2. Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
3. Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, Okla-
homa, and Oregon. 
4. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 (Page 1965). 
5. The Montana statute, which formerly called for "some fortuitous event," was 
amended to substitute the quoted language in 1961. MoNr. REv. ConFS ANN. § 92-418 
(1963). 
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clause,6 although Michigan has all but read it out again.7 Texas 
also began to read accidental into the coverage clause but later held 
that the term "injury" covered all injuries whether accidental or 
not.8 
When we turn to the decisional interpretation of the "by acci-
dent" concept, we discover several components. The basic and indis-
pensable ingredient of "accident" is unexpectedness. The first lead-
ing English case, Fenton v. ]. Thorley b Company,9 embodied this 
factor in the following definition: "an unlooked for mishap or an 
untoward event which is not expected or designed."10 Up to this 
point, it can be seen that there is nothing in the "accident" require-
ment which seriously circumscribes liability in heart cases. There 
would be almost no heart attacks which are "expected or designed" 
as the result of whatever the claimant was doing, for, if the claimant 
expected a heart attack or death as a result of his action, he presum-
ably would have avoided the action. Indeed, the difficulties and the 
voluminous litigation that have swirled around the accident concept 
have flowed not from this common-sense dictionary meaning of "by 
accident," but from two very questionable limitations or distortions 
of the term, limitations which may or may not have been consciously 
adopted in order to build a retaining wall around liability in heart 
and comparable cases. 
The first of these two misreadings was the subtle conversion of 
the phrase "accidental injury" or the equivalent phrase "injury by 
accident" into the phrase "by an accident." This is unjustifiable 
both as a matter of grammar and as a matter of statutory intention. 
In the original British formula, "personal injury by accident arising 
out of and in the course of employment," and in the many statutes 
which have adopted this exact wording, the phrase "by accident" is 
clearly a modifier meaning the same as "accidental."11 True, the 
6. Michigan: Arnold v. Ogle Constr. Co., 333 Mich. 652, 53 N.W.2d 655 (1952); 
Marlowe v. Huron Mountain Club, 271 Mich. 107, 260 N.W. 130 (1935); see note 25 
infra for a detailed discussion. West Virginia: Martin v. State Compensation Comm'n, 
107 W. Va. 583, 149 S.E. 824 (1929); Archibald v. Compensation Comm'r, 77 W. Va. 
448, 87 S.E. 791 (1916), 1916D L.R.A. (n.s.) 1013. Wyoming: In re Scrogham, 52 Wyo. 
232, 73 P.2d 200 (1937); Pero v. Collier-Latimer, Inc., 49 Wyo. 131, 52 P.2d 690 (1935). 
7. See notes 30-43 infra and accompanying text. 
8. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mincey, 255 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). 
The statement in Middleton v. Texas Power &: Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 
(1916), that the statute covered only industrial accidents, was intended merely to 
distinguish wilful injuries, the remedy for which was thought to be guarded by the 
Texas Constitution. 
9. [1903] A.C, 443. 
IO. Id. at 448. 
11. "It was held that 'injury by accident' meant nothing more than 'accidental 
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wording in some state acts has been altered so that "accident" has 
become the noun, itself modified by the "arising" phrase, but this is 
not true of the formula in its original and most common version. 
Of course, having once rewritten the statute so as to read "by an 
accident," the courts were then in a position to set forth on their 
endless search for "the accident" in heart cases and other situations 
in which there did not happen to be some obvious industrial mishap 
or highway collision. 
An even greater source of difficulty in the heart cases has been 
the gratuitous insistence by many courts that the accidental quality 
of the episode be found in the cause rather than in the result. The 
most familiar manifestation of this insistence is the development of 
the "unusual-exertion" requirement for compensability in heart 
cases. To refer again to our original case of the man who has lifted 
I 00-pound sacks many times a day and then suffers a heart attack 
while lifting one such sack in the usual way: It is evident that if a 
court construes the idea of an "untoward event" or "unlooked for 
mishap" as confined exclusively to the cause, that is, the outward 
circumstances immediately preceding the injury, nothing unex-
pected can be shown. But if accidental content can be supplied by 
the unexpected effect on this individual, then the injury can cor-
rectly be described as accidental. 
This entire controversy should have been and could have been 
avoided if the courts had followed the well-settled doctrine that 
when a legislature adopts a statute which has already been authori-
tatively construed, it has adopted that construction.12 Well before 
any American states copied the "injury by accident" terminology of 
the British Act, it was settled beyond question in England that, al-
though the cause of injury was routine and not accidental, a claim 
was compensable if the effect on the employee was unexpected and 
catastrophic, and therefore accidental. The House of Lords consid-
ered this exact situation in 190313 and again in 1910.14 In the latter 
case, the routine strain of tightening a nut caused an aneurysm to 
break, and this was held to be injury by accident. In February, 1912, 
Professor Bohlen wrote an article which was widely read as a guide 
injury' •••• " Lord MacNaghten in Clover, Clayton &: Co. v. Hughes, [1910] A.C. 242, 
248, 3 .B.W.C.C. 775, 781. 
12. Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 99 Utah 28, 96 P.2d 722 (1939). 
13. Fenton v. J. Thorley&: Co., [1903] A.C. 443. 
14. Clover, Clayton &: Co. v. Hughes, [1910] A.C. 242, 3 .B.W.C.C. 775. For a good 
review of the English cases before and since this case, and of the Australian cases, see 
Ford, Workmen's Compensation-"Injury by Accident," 4 REs JuDICATAE 160 (1949). 
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to the drafting of compensation acts, pointing out these cases as 
establishing the authoritative meaning of the phrase.15 In spite of 
this background, however, a substantial number of American juris-
dictions adopted the requirement that a heart attack, to be com-
pensable, must have been produced by an exertion that was unusual 
for the particular worker. 
The jurisdictions which allow recovery for heart attacks caused 
by usual exertion now outnumber by almost two to one those that 
require unusual exertion. This is not to suggest that the exact posi-
tion of each jurisdiction can be classified with precision, but rather 
to give an overall impression of the present state of compensation 
law. Precision is impossible for many reasons, including contradic-
tory decisions within jurisdictions, conflicts between abstract state-
ments of rules and actual holdings on the facts, and assorted variants, 
exceptions, and distinctions that defy classification. With these 
preliminary caveats, one may hazard the statement that heart attacks 
from usual exertion may be compensable under federal decisions,16 
and in twenty states,17 while twelve jurisdictions still appear to 
require unusual exertion.18 
15. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. 
L. REv. 328, 337-43 (1912). 
16. Hancock v. Einbinder, 310 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1962), under District of Columbia 
Compensation Act; Vinson v. Einbinder, 307 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Southern 
Stevedoring Co. v. Henderson, 175 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949), under Longshoremen's Act; 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 124 F. Supp. 320 (D.D.C. 1954); Jenkins v. American 
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 113 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Tenn. 1953); Oceanic Fisheries Co. v. 
Alaska Industrial Bd., 109 F. Supp. 103 (D. Alaska 1953); Harbor Marine Contracting Co. 
v. Lowe, 61 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 152 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1945), under Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Act. 
17. Alabama: W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. Raines, 271 Ala. 671, 127 So. 2d 619 (1961). 
Arizona: Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cabarga, 79 Ariz. 148, 285 P.2d 605 (1955); cf. Pierce 
v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P.2d 1017 (1933). 
Arkansas: Rebsamen West, Inc. v. Bailey, 396 S.W .2d 822 (Ark. 1965); Arkansas-Best 
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Shinn, 235 Ark. 314, 357 S.W.2d 661 (1962); Johnson v. Bear Brand 
Roofing, Inc., 233 Ark. 639, 346 S.W .2d 472 (1961); International Paper Co. v. Myers, 233 
Ark. 378, 345 S.W .2d 1 (1961); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Dorman, 232 Ark. 749, 
340 e.w .2d 266 (1960); Freeman v. Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 232 Ark. 654, 339 S.W .2d 
427 (1960); Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S.W .2d 961 (1945); 
McGregor & Pickett v. Arrington, 206 Ark. 921, 175 S.W.2d 210 (1943); cf. the following 
cases in which the outcome is dependent upon which rule was followed by the Com-
mission: Latimer v. Sevier County Farmers' Co-op., Inc., 233 Ark. 762, 346 S.W .2d 673 
(1961); Duke v. Pekin Wood Prods. Co., 223 Ark. 182, 264 S.W.2d 834 (1954); C. & B. 
Constr. Co. v. Roach, 220 Ark. 405, 248 S.W.2d 368 (1952); Farmer v. L. H. Knight Co., 
220 Ark. 333, 248 S.W .2d 111 (1952); Baker v. Slaughter, 220 Ark. 325, 248 S.W .2d 106 
(1952). 
Georgia: Burson v. Howell, 112 Ga. App. 675, 145 S.E.2d 718 (1965); Sears, Roebuck 
& Co. v. Poole, 112 Ga. App. 527, 145 S.E.2d 615 (1965); Callaway Mills Co. v. Yates, 
106 Ga. App. 9, 126 S.E.2d 305 (1962); Fulton County v. Windsor, 100 Ga. App. 237, llO 
S.E.2d 594 (1959); Georgia Dep't of Revenue v. Hughes, 99 Ga. App. 127, 108 S.E.2d 184 
(1959); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 99 Ga. App. 124, 108 S.E.2d 180 (1959); Atlanta 
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Newspapers v. Clements, 88 Ga. App. 648, 76 S.E.2d 830 (1953); Federated Mut. 
Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Elliot, 88 Ga. App. 266, 76 S.E.2d 568 (1953); Pacific 
Employer's Ins. Co. v. Donaldson, 81 Ga. App. 629, 59 S.E.2d 529 (1950); Lumbermen's 
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Kitchens, 81 Ga. App. 470, 59 S.E.2d 270 (1950). But cf. Gurin v. 
Bituminous Cas. Co., 107 Ga. App. 823, 131 S.E.2d 566 (1963). 
Idaho: Laird v. State Highway Dep't, 80 Idaho 12, 323 P.2d 1079 (1958); Lewis v. 
Department of Law Enforcement, 79 Idaho 40, 311 P .2d 976 (1957); Smith v. Sunshine 
Mining Co., 72 Idaho 8, 236 P.2d 87 (1951); Warlick v. Driscoll, 68 Idaho 552, 200 P.2d 
1014 (1948); Teater v. Dairymen's Co-op. Creamery, 68 Idaho 152, 190 P.2d 687 (1948). 
But cf. Brown v. Stevens, 84 Idaho 432, 373 P.2d 332 (1962); Sutton v. Brown's Tie & 
Lumber Co., 83 Idaho 265, 361 P.2d 793 (1961); Dunn v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 74 
Idaho 210, 260 P.2d 398 (1953); Swan v. Williamson, 74 Idaho 32, 257 P.2d 552 (1953); 
Carrie v. Carrie, 73 Idaho 503, 254 P.2d 410 (1953). 
Illinois: Bruno v. Industrial Comm'n, 31 Ill. 2d 447, 202 N.E.2d 13 (1964); Clifford-
Jacobs Forging Co. v. Indcstrial Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 236, 166 N.E.2d 582 (1960); Laclede 
Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 296, 128 N.E.2d 718 (1955); .Bethlehem Steel 
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 290, 128 N.E.2d 714 (1955); Town of Cicero v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 404 Ill. 487, 89 N.E.2d 354 (1949). 
Kansas: Geurian v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 192 Kan. 589, 389 P.2d 782 
(1964); Pence v. Centex Constr. Co., 189 Kan. 718, 371 P.2d 100 (1962); Karle v. Board of 
Comm'rs, 188 Kan. 800, 366 P.2d 241 (1961); Bohanan v. Schlozman Ford, Inc., 188 Kan. 
795, 366 P.2d 28 (1961); Price v. McSpaden, 188 Kan. 578, 363 P.2d 533 (1961); Thuillez 
v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 187 Kan. 618, 358 P.2d 676 (1961); Alpers v. George-
Nielsen Motor Co., 182 Kan. 790, 324 P.2d 177 (1958); Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 
180 Kan. 295, 303 P.2d 197 (1956); Peterson v. Safeway Stores, 158 Kan. 271, 146 P.2d 
657 (1944); Hill v. Etchen Motor Co., 143 Kan. 655, 56 P.2d 103 (1936); cf Transmeier v. 
Blaw-Knox Constr. Co., 191 Kan. 321, 380 P.2d 322 (1963). 
Kentucky: Johnson v. Stone, 357 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1962). See also Grimes v. Goodlett 
& Adams, 345 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1961); Terry v. Associated Stone Co., 334 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 
1960); cf. Nashville Coal Co. v. Epley, 350 S.W.2d 463 (Ky. 1961); Salmon v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 275 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1955); H. Smith Coal Co. v. Marshall, 243 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 
1951). 
Louisiana: Prater v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 182 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 1966); Richard 
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 247 La. 943, 175 So. 2d 277 (1965); Spivey v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 127 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 1961); McKnight v. Clemons, 114 So. 2d 114 
(La. App. 1959); Brian v. Employers Cas. Co., 111 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 1959); Sharp v. 
Esso Standard Oil Co., 72 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 1954). 
Maine: Taylor's Case, 127 Me. 207, 142 Atl. 730 (1928). 
Michigan: Zaremba v. Chrysler Corp., 377 Mich. 226, 139 N.W.2d 745 (1966); 
Mottonen v. Calumet & Hecla, Inc., 360 Mich. 659, 105 N.W.2d 33 (1960); Barger v. 
City of Saginaw, 358 Mich. 423, 100 N.W.2d 208 (1960). The following cases applying an 
earlier rule are now obsolete: Wieda v. American .Box Board Co., 343 Mich. 182, 72 
N.W.2d 13 (1955); McGregor v. Michigan Dep't of Conservation, 338 Mich. 93, 61 
N.W.2d 68 (1953); O'Neil v. W.R. Spencer Grocer Co., 316 Mich. 320, 25 N.W.2d 213 
(1946); Poindexter v. Department of Conservation, 316 Mich. 235, 25 N.W.2d 182 
(1946). 
Mississippi: I.B.S. Mfg. Co. v. Dependents of Cook, 241 Miss. 256, 130 So. 2d 557 
(1961); Pennington v. Dependents of Smith, 232 Miss. 775, 100 So. 2d 569 (1958); 
Schilling v. Mississippi State Forestry Comm'n, 226 Miss. 858, 85 So. 2d 562 (1956); 
Thornbrough Well Servicing Co. v . .Brown, 223 Miss. 322, 78 So. 2d 159 (1955). 
Montana: Murphy v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 321 P.2d 1094 (1958); Rathbun 
v. Taber Tank Lines, 129 Mont. 121, 283 P.2d 966 (1955). 
New Jersey: Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 178 A.2d 161 (1962); Ciuba v. 
Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127, 141 A.2d 761 (1958). 
Oklahoma: C. T. Hughes Constr. Co. v. Phillips, 401 P.2d 498 (Okla. 1965); H. J. 
Jefferies Truck Line v. Grisham, 397 P.2d 637 (Okla. 1964); Lea Mach. Co. v. Emmons, 
395 P.2d 857 (Okla. 1964); Co-operative Publishing Co. v. Jestes, 373 P.2d 33 (Okla. 
1962); Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Orum, 366 P.2d 919 (Okla. 1961); Rigdon & Bruen Oil Co, 
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II. THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE 
Before undertaking an analytical judgment concerning the op-
timum working rule for heart cases, one may first set the stage by 
tracing in detail two of the more interesting attempts by states to 
an-ive at a solution. The Michigan experience is significant because 
it provides one of the most dramatic illustrations of the over-all 
trend in the heart cases. Michigan began establishing restrictions 
based on the "accident" concept without even having a "by acci-
dent" limitation in its basic statutory coverage clause. However, in 
v. Beerman, 346 P.2d 169 (Okla. 1959); State Highway Dep't v. Powell, 258 P.2d 1189 
(Okla. 1953); Boettcher Oil &: Gas Co. v. Lamb, 208 Okla. 192, 255 P .2d 277 (1953); Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Rouse, 202 Okla. 395, 214 P.2d 251 (1949); Clarksburg Paper Co. v. Roper, 
196 Okla. 504, 166 P.2d 425 (1946). 
Oregon: Olson v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 222 Ore. 407, 352 P.2d 1096 (1960). 
Tenn~ssee: Blair v. Aluminum Co. of America, 217 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); 
Gluck Bros. v. Breeden, 387 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. 1965); Ward v. Commercial Ins. Co., 
213 Tenn. 100, 372 S.W.2d 292 (1963); Coleman v. Coker, 204 Tenn. 310, 321 S.W.2d 
540 (1959); Lay v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 196 Tenn. 63, 264 S.W.2d 223 (1953); 
Patterson Transfer Co. v. Lewis, 195 Tenn. 474, 260 S.W.2d 182 (1953); cf. Hagewood 
v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours &: Co., 206 Tenn. 239, 332 S.W.2d 660 (1960). 
Texas: Midwestern Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 370 S.W .2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); United 
States Fid. &: Guar. Co. v. Herzik, 359 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Texas 
Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Frazier, 259 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Texas Employers 
Ins. Ass'n v. Smith, 235 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Southern Underwriters v. 
Hoopes, 120 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). 
Utah: The heart cases in Utah which appeared to require overexertion have been 
expressly superseded by the generally-applicable rule laid down in Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah I, 201 P.2d 961 (1949), an intervertebral disc award. 
West Virginia: Gilbert v. Compensation Comm'r, 121 W. Va. 10, 1 S.E.2d 167 (1939). 
18. Colorado: Skinner v. Industrial Comm'n, 152 Colo. 97, 381 P.2d 253 (1963); 
Industrial Comm'n v. Hesler, 149 Colo. 592, 370 P.2d 428 (1962): Huff v. Aetna Ins. Co., 
146 Colo. 63, 360 P.2d 667 (1961). 
Delaware: Faline v. Guido &: Francis DeAscanis &: Sons, 192 A.2d 921 (Del. 1963). 
Florida: Friendly Frost Used Appliances v. Reiser, 152 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1963); cf. 
Gray v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 64 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1953), which accepted the 
unexpected-result rule. 
Indiana: Douglas v. Warner Gear Div. of .Borg Warner Corp., 131 Ind. App. 664, 
174 N.E.2d 584 (1961); cf. Slaubaugh v. Vore, 123 Ind. App. 497, 110 N.E.2d 299 (1953). 
Missouri: State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 319, 153 S.W.2d 
40 (1941); Flippin v. First Nat'! Bank, 372 S.W.2d 273 (Springfield, Mo., Ct. App. 1963); 
Joiner v. Farmers Exchange Co-op. Ass'n No. 304, 368 S.W.2d 547 (Kansas City, Mo., Ct. 
App. 1963); Love v. Land, 356 S.W.2d 105 (Kansas City, Mo., Ct. App. 1962). 
Nebraska: Cochran v. Bellevue .Bridge Comm'n, 174 Neb. 761, 119 N.W.2d 292 (1963); 
Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945); Rose v. City of Fairmont, 140 
Neb. 550, 300 N.W. 574 (1941). 
North Carolina: Ferrell v. Montgomery &: Aldridge Sales Co., 262 N.C. 76, 136 
S.E.2d 227 (1964); Bellamy v. Morace Stevedoring Co., 258 N.C. 327, 128 S.E.2d 395 
(1962); West v. North Carolina Dep't of Conservation&: Dev., 229 N.C. 232, 49 S.E.2d 398 
(1948). 
Ohio: Meese v. Wylie, 169 Ohio St. 252, 158 N.E.2d 891 (1959); Gerlich v. Republic 
Steel Corp., 153 Ohio St. 463, 92 N.E.2d 393 (1950); McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 152 
Ohio St. 269, 89 N.E.2d 138 (1949); Nelson v. Industrial Comm'n, 150 Ohio St. 1, 80 
N.E.2d 430 (1948); Stewart v. Young, 112 Ohio App. 433, 176 N.E.2d 322 (1961); Heath v. 
Standard Oil Co., 68 Ohio L. Abs. 571, 112 N.E.2d 405 (Ct. App. 1953). 
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common with two other jurisclictions,19 Michigan read the "acci-
dental" requirement into the coverage formula anyway, and, so 
equipped, proceeded to develop a typical line of cases denying com-
pensation in the absence of unusual exertion. For example, com-
pensation was denied for heart attacks suffered by a salesman while 
driving in a snow storm,20 a fire warden while performing his du-
ties,21 and an employee while testifying in court.22 
At the same time, Michigan, like every other jurisdiction with 
the unusual-exertion requirement, was occasionally producing a case 
which gave the unmistakable impression of clutching at straws in 
order to save awards by finding unusualness in the most trivial cir-
cumstances. For example, in Schlange v. Briggs Mfg. Co.,23 a coro-
nary thrombosis was attributed to the workman's "performing his 
usual work in an unusual manner and with the exertion of unusual 
force." The unusualness arose from the fact that the workman was 
using a round collet instead of a hexagonal one to hold a hexagonal 
fixture, and extra effort was required because of the tendency of the 
fixture to slip. 
An important part in the unfolding Michigan story was contrib-
uted by the legislature in 1943 when it removed all but five of the 
fifty-four uses of the word "accident" in the Act and introduced the 
"single-event" test.24 One of the few places from which the accident 
Pennsylvania: Good v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Property & Supplies, 346 Pa. 151, 30 
A.2d 434 (1943); McGowan v. Upper Darby Pet Supply, 207 Pa. Super. 329, 217 A.2d 
846 (1966); Shatto v • .Bardinet Exports, Inc., 170 Pa. Super. 16, 84 A.2d 388 (1951); Cope 
v. Philadelphia Toilet Laundry & Supply Co., 167 Pa. Super. 205, 74 A.2d 775 (1950); 
Powell v. Hills Garage, 150 Pa. Super. 17, 27 A.2d 773 (1942). 
South Carolina: Walker v. City of Columbia, 146 S.E.2d 856 (S.C. 1966); Lorick v. 
South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 245 S.C. 513, 141 S.E.2d 662 (1965); Jones v. Williams• 
burg County, 245 S.C. 434, 141 S.E.2d 100 (1965); Rhodes v. Guignard Brick Works, 245 
S.C. 304, 140 S.E.2d 487 (1965); Black v • .Barnwell County, 243 S.C. 531, 134 S.E.2d 753 
(1964); West v. City of Spartanburg, 236 S.C. 553, 115 S.E.2d 295 (1960); Sims v. South 
Carolina Comm'n of Forestry, 235 S.C. 1, 109 S.E.2d 701 (1959); Price v • .B. F. Shaw 
Co., 224 S.C. 89, 77 S.E.2d 491 (1953). 
South Dakota: Cooper v. Vinatieri, 73 S.D. 418, 43 N.W.2d 747 (1950). 
Washington: Windust v. Department of Labor & Indus., 52 Wash. 2d 33, 323 P.2d 
241 (1958), overruling Merritt v. Department of Labor & Indus., 41 Wash. 2d 633, 251 
P.2d 158 (1952), and McCormick Lumber Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 7 
Wash. 2d 40, 108 P.2d 807 (1941). See also Taylor v. Department of Labor & Indus., 416 
P.2d 455 (Wash. 1966); Warner v. Department of Labor & Indus., 414 P.2d 628 (Wash. 
1966); Lawson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 63 Wash. 2d 79, 385 P.2d 537 (1963); 
Kruse v. Department of Labor & Indus., 52 Wash. 2d 453, 326 P.2d 58 (1958). 
19. See note 6 supra. 
20. O'Neil v. W. R. Spencer Grocer Co., 316 Mich. 320, 25 N.W.2d 213 (1946). 
21. McGregor v. Michigan Dep't of Conservation, 338 Mich. 93, 61 N.W.2d 68 (1953). 
22. Poindexter v. Department of Conservation, 316 Mich. 235, 25 N.W .2d 182 (1946). 
23. 326 Mich. 552, 40 N.W.2d 454 (1950). 
24. Mich. Pub. Acts 1943, No. 245. 
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concept was not removed was the title, where the reference to com-
pensation for accidental injuries was retained. After a period of 
some uncertainty, the Michigan Supreme Court specifically con-
cluded, by a vote of five to three, that accidental injury was still 
required despite the 1943 amendments.25 
Coming changes in legal doctrine are often heralded by a per-
suasive dissenting opinion. In the Michigan heart cases, this func-
tion was performed by the dissenting opinion of Justice Smith in 
Wieda v. American Box Board Company,26 a case in which the 
majority denied compensation for a coronary thrombosis. The dis-
sent examined both the general effect of the 1943 amendments on 
the accident requirement and the specific application of the statute 
to unexpected-result and usual-exertion heart cases. As to the former, 
Justice_ Smith said:27 
It will be observed that the insertion of the suggested word "ac-
cidental" has been rejected. It should also be noted that the same 
amendment undertook a wholesale excision of the words "accident" 
and "accidental injury," from other portions of the act, and the 
substitution of the word "injury." 
As to the latter, he said that the word "accident" includes both the 
expected cause and the expected result,28 and he adduced the follow-
ing quotation from the original English case of Fenton v. ]. Thorley 
& Company: 29 
If a man, in lifting a weight or trying to move something not 
easily moved, were to strain a muscle or rick his back, or rupture 
himself, the mishap in ordinary parlance would be described as an 
accident. Anybody would say that the man had met with an accident 
in lifting a weight, or trying to move something too heavy for him. 
The decisions which finally reversed the Michigan rule were not 
heart cases, but there was never any doubt that the heart cases were 
embraced within the new principles established in Sheppard v. 
25. Arnold v. Ogle Constr. Co., 333 Mich. 652, 53 N.W .2d 655 (1952). For a discussion 
of the varying points of view on the significance of cases between the 1943 amendments 
and Arnold, see the opinions in Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 
N.W.2d 614 (1957). The principal cases during this period include: Kasarewski v. Hupp 
Motor Car Corp., 315 Mich. 225, 23 N.W.2d 689 (1946); Anderson v. General Motors 
Corp., 313 Mich. 630, 22 N.W .2d 108 (1946); Hagopian v. Highland Park, 313 Mich. 
608, 22 N.W.2d 116 (1946). 
26. 343 Mich. 182, 72 N.W.2d 13 (1955). 
27. Id. at 203, 72 N.W.2d at 24. 
28. Id. at 196, 72 N.W.2d at 19. 
29. [1903] A.C. 443, at 446. For previous discussion of Fenton, see text accompanying 
notes 9 8: 10 supra. 
450 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:441 
Michigan National Bank80 and Coombe v. Penegor.81 Sheppard in-
volved a back injury which occurred when claimant tugged at a tray 
of cards weighing about twenty-five pounds. Coombe involved a cere-
bral hemorrhage and stroke resulting from the claimant's strenuous 
but usual exertion in fastening logs onto a logging truck with chains. 
For anyone having more than a passing interest in this topic in 
Michigan, the eighty pages of opinion, concurring opinions, dis-
senting opinions, and addenda in the report of these two cases are 
required reading. The reader's task will be lightened by the fact 
that there is a sense of high drama pervading these printed pages 
which shines through in some of the most vivid legal writing imagin-
able. The language of the battlefield repeatedly turns up in the 
opinions. Justice Black, in his first opinion in Coombe, after citing 
a number of conflicting opinions, asked: "Who is to say, until we 
do, which of these warring groups of decisions shall determine [the] 
applicability of part 7?"32 Again, in his opening opinion in Sheppard, 
Justice Black wrote: 
Brazauskis (Brazauskis v. Muskegon County Board of Road Com-
missioners, 345 Mich. 480), the 4 to 4 deadlock. of April 2d last, and 
now the misshapen 3-2-2 monster known as Beltinck's Case (Beltinck 
v. Mt. Pleasant State Home and Training School, 346 Mich. 494), 
unitedly prove the parable. Indeed, they liken us to the Etruscan 
array, faltering at Tiber's bridge. Here we stand, wavering from 
term to term, fearful of unvarnished avowal, pictured as by Ma-
caulay's pen: 
"But those behind cried 'Forward!' 
And those before cried 'Back.I' "83 
Finally, Justice Edwards, concurring in Sheppard, on learning that 
a clear majority of the court had now appeared for the new rule, 
appended an addendum beginning with the cry of triumph: "Say 
not, the struggle naught availeth."34 
What clearly emerges from the dust of battle is that the acci-
dental quality of an injury in Michigan can now be supplied by an 
unexpected result, that unusual exertion is not indispensable in 
heart and similar cases, and that pre-existing weakness or disease 
30. 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957). 
31. 348 Mich. 635, 83 N.W .2d 603 (1957). 
32. Id. at 640, 83 N.W.2d at 606. 
33. 348 Mich. at 579, 83 N.W.2d at 627. The lines of poetry are from Horatius 
stanza 50, in MACAULEY'S LAYS OF ANCIENT ROME (1928). 
34. 348 Mich. at 627, 83 N.W.2d at 636. The quote is the first line of Arthur Hugh 
Clough's, "Say not the Struggle Naught availeth," found in the OXFORD BOOK OF EN• 
GLISH VERSE, 1250-1918, at 898 (Quiller-Couch ed. 1940). 
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does not alter this basic rule. What is not quite so clear is whether 
the court has gone all the way in removing the accident requirement 
from the statute, undoing what was started by the Marlowe case,35 
and what was given a new lease on life by the Arnold case.36 In 
Sheppard and Coombe, all of the concurring justices except Justice 
Edwards stopped short of announcing a blanket elimination of the 
accident concept from the Michigan statute. There are a number of 
statements to the effect that the 1943 amendments eliminated the 
accident concept as previously interpreted by the court, and that the 
concept was abolished once and for all insofar as it formerly re-
quired an accidental or unexpected cause. But Justice Smith, in his 
concurring opinion in Sheppard, said: 
Eula Sheppard and Ewart Coombe are each entitled to compen-
sation, not because we "eliminate" accident from the act, not because 
of the presence or lack of a pre-existing ailment . • . but simply 
because each sufjered an unexpected mishap ( an accident, in our 
everyday speech) while doing his ordinary work in his ordinary way.31 
Justice Black, who wrote the primary opinion for the majority, 
announced that he was signing this opinion of Justice Smith. The 
opinions of Justice Edwards and Chief Justice Dethmers are desig-
nated merely as "concurring," i.e., presumably cqncurring with 
the primary opinion of Justice Smith. Justice Kelly, in turn, concurred 
with Chief Justice Dethmers, but in the process evenhandedly 
divided his approval between those of the justices who accepted the 
accident requirement and even extended it to require an accidental 
result as well as cause, and of Justice Edwards, whom Justice Kelly 
quoted as saying: "There is no longer a requirement that 'an acci-
dent' or 'a fortuitous' event (this court's previous definition of 'acci-
dent') be proven as a condition precedent for recovery of workmen's 
compensation for a single-event personal injury which arises out of 
and during the course of employment."38 There is thus some ques-
tion of precisely what Justice Kelly concurred in. 
This is not the end of the matter. In 1960, Justice Edwards found 
himself in the position of writing the majority opinion in the case 
which clearly applied the new doctrine to a heart attack, Mottonen 
v. Calumet & Hecla, Inc.39 Understandably, Justice Edwards in-
35. 271 Mich. 107, 260 N.W. 130 (1935). 
36. 333 Mich. 652, 53 N.W,2d 655 (1952). 
37. 348 Mich. at 605, 83 N.W,2d at 626. (Emphasis supplied by the court.) 
38. Id. at 634, 83 N.W .2d at 640. 
39. 360 Mich. 659, 105 N.W.2d !l!l (1960). 
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serted into the majority opinion of Mottonen his own interpretation 
of Sheppard and Coombe: 
The Sheppard and Coombe Cases served to eliminate from con-
struction of the Michigan workmen's compensation statute the 
former case-law requirement of proof of an accident ("a fortuitous 
circumstance") (see Arnold v. Ogle Construction Co., 333 Mich. 652) 
as a condition precedent to recovery of compensation where statu-
torily-required proofs were present.40 
Although this restatement of his own interpretation is not sur-
prising, there may be some significance in the fact that Justice 
Edward's opinion was concurred in by three other justices, includ-
ing Justice Smith, who said explicitly in Sheppard that the basis of 
the Sheppard and Coombe opinions was not that accident was 
"eliminated" from the act. 
Although it is something of an anti-climax after this excursion 
through the byways of the judicial process, one must nevertheless 
observe that it probably does not make very much difference in 
heart and other strain cases whether one accepts Justice Edward's 
view that Sheppard and Coombe eliminated the accident require-
ment, or the more cautious interpretation that they simply estab-
lished the unexpected-result and usual-exertion rules. This observa-
tion is supported by the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in 
Zaremba v. Chrysler Corporation,41 in which one final attempt to 
make the Sheppard and Coombe rule stop short of the usual-exertion 
test was firmly put down by the court. The Workmen's Compensa-
tion Board's interpretation of the cases was rejected and the court 
held that the exertion which caused disability or death did not have 
to be "strenuous" in character. The supreme court quoted from the 
Arkansas case of Bryant Stave & Heading Company v. White:42 
Notwithstanding anything we may have said in prior cases, we 
hold that an accidental injury arises out of the employment when 
the required exertion producing the injury is too great for the per-
son undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the 
condition of his health, provided the exertion is either the sole or a 
contributory cause of the injury. In short, that an injury is ac-
cidental when either the cause or result is unexpected or accidental, 
although the work being done is usual or ordinary. [Emphasis by 
the Michigan Supreme Court.] 
40. Id. at 660, 105 N.W.2d at 33. 
41. 377 Mich. 226, 139 N.W.2d 745 (1966). 
42. 227 Ark. 147, 155, 296 S.W.2d 436, 441 (1956), quoted in Zaremba v. Chrysler 
Corp., 377 Mich. 226, 231, 139 N.W .2d 745, 748 (1966). This same language was also 
quoted by Justice Smith in Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 582-83, 83 
N.W.2d 614,615 (1957). 
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This quotation is followed by the statement: "It is difficult to tell 
from the 5 separate opinions [in Sheppard] exactly what the case 
stood for then and what it stands for now. If it does not stand for 
the foregoing quoted rule, I think it ought to."43 Four justices con-
curred in this opinion, while three justices concurred separately on 
the ground that the Commission was warranted in finding that the 
employee's work was unrelated to his heart attack. Consequently, 
for whatever the observation is worth, we now seem to have at least 
a five to three majority agreeing upon the meaning of Sheppard. So 
understood, the Michigan rule as to the range of heart and similar 
cases which are compensable as accidental injuries is now as generous 
as that of any jurisdiction in the country. 
III. THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 
The other state whose experience deserves detailed examination 
is New York. The history of what has happened in New York is of 
prime interest to any state which is still trying to apply the unusual-
exertion test, because it shows what happens to that rule when a 
sufficient volume and variety of cases puts it to every possible test. 
The net result amounts to this: New York began with an emphatic 
requirement of unusual and even catastrophic cause, but, by a grad-
ual decrease in the "unusualness" of the unusual cause required, it 
reached a point where, in effect, any heart attack to which the em-
ployment contributed seemed to be held accidental; then, appar-
ently impressed by the need for some principle that would keep 
heart case liability from being virtually unbounded, it added an 
alternative test-the strain must have been "greater than the ordi-
nary wear and tear of life." 
A. The Results in New York 
The New York story may be opened with the following quota-
tion from an opinion by Judge Pound, speaking for a unanimous 
Court of Appeals in Lerner v. Rump Brothers:44 
4!!. Zaremba v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 42, at 231, 139 N.W.2d at 748. 
44. 241 N.Y. 153, 155, 149 N.E. 334, 3!!5, 41 A.L.R. 1122 (1925). In Lerner, from 
which this quotation is taken, decedent caught a cold as a result of spending ten 
minutes in a refrigerator, following which he died of causes traceable to the lowered 
resistance produced by the cold. Compensation was denied for want of anything 
catastrophic or extraordinary. By contrast, in Matter of Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 
240 N.Y. 8!!, 147 N.E. 366 (1925), cited in the quotation, an undertaker's assistant 
contracted an infection through a cut finger which spread through contact with a 
pimple on his neck. This episode was held to be accidental in all its phases. 
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A distinction exists between accidental injury and disease, but disease 
may be an accidental injury. The exception arises out of abnormal 
conditions which must be established to sustain an award. Two con-
current limitations have been placed on the right to recover an 
award when a disease, not the natural and unavoidable result of the 
employment, is developed during the course of the employment, al-
though it does not follow that compensation should be awarded in 
all cases coming literally within these limitations. First, the incep-
tion of the disease must be assignable to a determinate or single act, 
identified in space or time. (Matter of J effreyes v. Sager Co., 198 
App. Div. 446; 233 N.Y. 535) Secondly, it must also be assignable to 
something catastrophic or extraordinary. (Matter of Connelly v. 
Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N.Y. 83). 
In the heart cases, the issue almost from the start centered on the 
question whether there was anything unusual about the exertion 
producing the attack or about the circumstances surrounding it. In 
1935, compensation was denied to an employee who collapsed and 
died shortly after having performed a routine job of lifting and 
moving merchandise in a store basement.45 But, in 1939, an award 
to a truck driver who died of a heart attack from the strain of crank-
ing his truck was unanimously affirmed;46 the catastrophic or un-
usual element seems to have been supplied by the fact that the con-
denser and distributor on the truck had burned out. The next year, 
compensation was denied for the death of a blacksmith who, because 
of icy weather, carried his tools three blocks to a stable instead of 
having the horses come to the shop.47 And in 1941, compensation 
was similarly denied to an employee whose heart attack was brought 
on by the exertion, normal in his work, of pushing an overhead tree 
loaded with 400 pounds of meat.48 
Shortly thereafter, the courts became somewhat more willing to 
find that the activity causing the attack was "unusual." In 1942, the 
heart attack of a housekeeper in an apartment house was deemed 
accidental since it followed her climbing four flights of stairs three 
times within fifteen or twenty minutes, the last time carrying a 
heavy mirror.49 In 1943, the looser "unusualness" rule was adum-
45. Frankel v. National 5, 10 and 25 Cent Stores, 243 App. Div. 841, 278 N.Y.S. 450, 
aff'd, 268 N.Y. 509, 198 N.E. 378 (1935). 
46. Green v. Geiger, 255 App. Div. 903, 7 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1938), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 610, 
20 N.E.2d 559 (1939). 
47. La Fountain v. La Fountain, 259 App. Div. 1095, 21 N.Y.S.2d 193, aff'd, 284 N.Y. 
729, 31 N.E.2d 199 (1940). 
48. Dworak v. E. Greenbaum Co., 261 App. Div. 1023, 25 N.Y.S.2d 829, aff'd, 287 N.Y. 
555, 38 N.E.2d 224 (1941). 
49. McCormack v. Wood Harmon Warranty Corp., 263 App. Div. 914, 32 N.Y.S.2d 
145, afj'd, 288 N.Y. 614, 42 N.E.2d 613 (1942). 
January 1967) Workmen's Compensation 455 
brated in the case of a furnace-stoker who collapsed after throwing 
a dozen shovels of coal, each weighing about forty pounds, on the 
fire. This was held to be an accidental injury, in spite of the fact that 
the shoveling was his regular job. 50 During the next two years, a 
plant patrolman's coronary occlusion was found accidental because 
he had patroled an outside beat in extremely cold weather and 
during a heavy snowstorm (although his job was to patrol in all 
kinds of weather);51 the exertion of a fireman who ran up two flights 
of stairs, halfway down, and then up again was deemed "unusual," 
(although realistically it was surely a routine activity for a fire-
man);52 and the necessity of remaining in a cramped position for an 
hour to tamp new firebrick inside a boiler was deemed sufficient to 
convert a strain into an accidental injury.53 Beginning with Cooper 
v. Brunswick Cigar Company54 in 1948, the newer view began to 
affect even the language of the opinions, in that reference to the 
unusualness of the exertion was sometimes altogether omitted. In 
Cooper, an award was made for the death of a trucker who, because 
he had no helper, had put in an unusually hard day, lifting cartons 
two at a time in order to save time. The Appellate Division's opin-
ion said that "the board could find that the heart attack which 
caused the death was produced by the labor incident to the employ-
ment."55 
From 1948 on, a series of cases emerged which threatened to 
reduce the unusualness test to a hollow shell. In one case a painter 
had placed his ladder so that he had to stretch his arm "all the way 
out" in order to paint, and the Appellate Division held that the 
"extreme exertion and extension of his arms in painting" satisfied 
the requirement of accidental injury.56 In another instance, a de-
liveryman who suffered a heart attack while carrying a sixty-pound 
case of beer was granted compensation: the only non-routine feature 
in his case was the fact that the driveway on which he was walking 
was somewhat slippery.57 But-to show that the old requirement 
50. Bohm v. L. R. S. &: B. Realty Co., 264 App. Div. 962, 37 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1942), 
aff'd, 289 N.Y. 808, 47 N.E.2d 52 (1943). 
51. Flammer v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 268 App. Div. 944, 51 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1944), aff'd, 
295 N.Y. 817, 66 N.E.2d 588 (1946). 
52. Godsman v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp., 268 App. Div. 945, 51 N.Y.S.2d 368 
(1944), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 708, 65 N.E.2d 339 (1946). 
53. Brooks v. Elliott Bates, Inc., 269 App. Div. 792, 55 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1945), aff'd, 
295 N.Y. 710, 65 N.E.2d 340 (1946) (two judges dissenting). 
54. 273 App. Div. 1038, 79 N.Y.S.2d 867, aff'd, 298 N.Y. 731, 83 N.E.2d 142 (1948). 
55. Id. at 1038, 79 N.Y.S.2d at 867. 
56. Ruby v. Lustig, 274 App. Div. 954, 83 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 759, 
87 N.E.2d 672 (1949). 
57. Serie v. F. &: M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 273 App. Div. 833, 76 N.Y.S,2d 50 (1948). 
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was still capable of defeating claims-in the same year and only nine 
pages away in the same volume of reports, the same court denied 
compensation for the death of a house superintendent who suffered 
a coronary occlusion while carrying down stairs garbage cans which 
weighed seventy pounds-ten pounds more than the beer case and 
on stairs at that. 58 
Then came a series of cases which held that accidental injury 
could be shown merely by proof that the decedent had been working 
harder than he had worked at some time in the past. For example, 
one claimant, upon being promoted to the responsible job of super-
vising construction of three new shops, worked long hours seven 
days a week for nine or ten months, experiencing heart symptoms 
from time to time. The Appellate Division found this assignment to 
be "unusual work," and held that "claimant sustained accidental 
injuries arising out of and in the course of employment due to long 
and arduous hours of work."59 In 1949, an inspector was brought 
within the protective orbit of "accident" solely because "the work 
done by claimant had about a month earlier been changed so that 
fewer men were doing the same volume of inspections which in-
creased claimant's physical effort."60 In other words, a strain which 
had been usual and routine for a month was an "accident" because 
a month earlier the claimant had had lighter work. 
By 1950, the Court of Appeals apparently felt it had had 
enough of this sort of thing, and, in Masse v. James H. Robinson 
Company,61 while awarding compensation to a man who had 
undergone unusually arduous work during the week preceding 
a heart attack which occurred at home, it made the following 
unqualified statement: "A heart injury such as coronary occlusion 
or thrombosis when brought on by overexertion or strain in the 
course of daily work is compensable, though a pre-existing pathology 
may have been a contributing factor."62 Nothing was said about 
unusual strain; the language indicated that recovery would be per-
mitted not only for overexertion, but also for "strain in the course 
of daily work." 
Later in the same year, while finding compensable the effects of 
58. Chiara v. Villa Charlotte Bronte, Inc., 273 App. Div. 834, 76 N.Y.S.2d 59, afj'd, 298 
N.Y. 604, 81 N.E.2d 332 (1948). 
59. Furtardo v. American Export Airlines, Inc., 274 App. Div. 954, 83 N.Y.S.2d 745, 
746 (1948), leave to appeal denied, 298 N.Y. 933 (1949). 
60. Carlin v. Colgate Aircraft Corp., 276 App. Div. 881, 93 N.Y.S.2d 791, 792 (1949), 
afj'd, 301 N.Y. 754, 95 N.E.2d 626 (1950). 
61. 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56 (1950). 
62. Id. at 37, 92 N.E.2d at 57. 
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spending five or ten minutes in the usual cramped position a steam 
fitter has to assume while working on the inside of a boiler, the 
Appellate Division summarized New York law from Lerner to 
Masse: 
Appellants . . . cite the definition of an accident as something ex-
traordinary or catastrophic, assignable to a determinate or single act, 
identified in space or time. [Citing Lerner.] 
As an abstract legal proposition undoubtedly this definition is 
unassailable. However whether an event is to be found an industrial 
accident is not to be determined by legal definition "but by the 
common-sense viewpoint of the average man." [Citing Masse.] Hence 
the issue almost invariably falls within the realm of fact, and if the 
facts and circumstances sustain, upon any reasonable hypothesis, 
the conclusion that an average man would view the event as ac-
cidental, then the determination of the Board is final. We think such 
determinative facts and circumstances were presented in the instant 
case, and that common men would regard decedent's injuries as 
accidental. At least we cannot say as a matter of law that such is not 
the case. Applications of this principle, though often not expressed, 
are inherent in many decisions.63 
There is something indescribably poignant about the periodic 
efforts of highly-trained legal minds to dispose of intricate and 
troublesome questions of law by invoking "the common-sense view-
point of the average man." Would the average man who saw a steam 
fitter crouched in his usual position or a carpenter operating a mor-
tising machine in the usual way view the resulting injuries as "acci-
dental"? The plain fact is that the viewpoint of the average man 
would quickly eliminate the entire tortuous usual-unusual exertion 
distinction, since it is not common sense to equate the merely un-
usual with the accidental. 
It is salutary at this point to recall the words of Lord Coke, Chief 
Justice of England in the early seventeenth century, responding to 
King James I's statement that the law was founded upon reason, that 
the King as well as the judges possessed reason, and that the King 
might therefore remove from the judges any causes he pleased and 
decide them himself. Lord Coke answered: 
[T]rue it was that God had endowed His Majesty with excellent 
sciences and great endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not 
learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which con-
cern the life or inheritance, or goods or fortunes of his subjects, are 
63. Broderick v. Liebmann Breweries, Inc., 277 App. Div. 422, 424, 100 N.Y.S.2d 
837, 839 (1950); accord, Clayback v. Globe Woven Belting Co., 282 App. Div. 973, 125 
N.Y.S.2d 493 (1953). 
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not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and 
judgment of [the] law .... 64 
In the period following Masse, the "artificial reason and judgment 
of the law" again came into play, and in place of the permissive and 
vague "common sense" rule, there emerged a set of two, and perhaps 
three, discernible tests operating side by side. Before distilling these 
tests from the mass of reported cases, however, it might be useful to 
set forth in summary factual form the panorama of awards and 
denials since Masse. 
The most common causal situation is that of a heart attack 
caused by lifting; awards have been based in whole or in part on 
lifting weights ranging from thirteen pounds to one hundred and 
fifty pounds.65 Cases in which awards have been made have involved 
the lifting of articles varying from four empty bottles,66 shoe boxes,67 
64. Conference between King James I and the Judges of England, Roberts' 
Case, 12 Co. Rep. 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1344 (K.B. 1612). Note that in 1612 the word "arti• 
ficial" did not carry the somewhat derogatory implication it conveys today. It was a 
complimentary word, connoting highly-developed skill, learning, and inventiveness. 
For example, note the inscription preceding the Sixth Pavin in ROBERT DOWLAND, 
VARIETIE OF LU'I'E LESSONS (1610): "Composed by the most Artificiall and famous Al-
fonso Terrabasco of Bologna." 
65. Schutzel v. Gelobters Distribs., 24 App. Div. 2d 793, 263 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1965) 
(10 to 30 pounds); Abbott v. Bedford Prod. Div., Nat'! Dairy Prod. Corp., 15 App. Div. 
2d 31, 221 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1961) (13 pounds); Puccio v. General Cable Corp., 13 App. 
Div. 2d 558, 211 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1961) (15 pounds); Uletas v. Elliott, 18 App. Div. 2d 849, 
236 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1963) (20 pounds); Castellano v. B &: A Specialties Co., 23 App. Div. 
2d 931, 259 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1965), ajj'd, 269 N.Y.S.2d 720, 216 N.E.2d 712 (1966) (30 
pounds); Williams v. Bumper &: Auto Plating, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 997, 229 N.Y.S.2d 
731 (1962) (40 pounds); Greenberg v. Standard Overall Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 565, 212 
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1961) (40 pounds); Ertle v. Morris Erde, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 797, 192 N.Y.S.2d 
784 (1959) (40 pounds); Colone v. Tavern on the Green, 21 App. Div. 2d 930, 251 
N.Y.S.2d 129 (1964) (50 pounds); Geschwer v. Tee Jay Toys, Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 615, 
222 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1961) (50 pounds); Gillar v. Jarcho Bros., 282 App. Div. 968, 125 
N.Y.S.2d 465 (1953) (55 pounds); Post v. Wallauer Paint Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 981, 254 
N.Y.S.2d 720 (1964) (60 pounds); Witten v. Sargoy &: Stein, 15 App. Div. 2d 617, 222 
N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961) (64 pounds); Wood v. John C. Monroe, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 829, 
209 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1961) (70 pounds); Sczesniak v. Whitney, 12 App. Div. 2d 366, 211 
N.Y.S.2d 581 (1961) (70 pounds); Adler v. N. Adler's Son, Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 1050, 
265 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1965) (75 pounds): Gordon v. Cenu Fibres, 10 App. Div. 2d 655, 196 
N.Y.S.2d 349 (1960) (85 pounds); Webb v. Twelve Pine Street, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 555, 
206 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1960) (90 pounds); Wagner v. City Prod. Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d 551, 
199 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1960) (100 pounds); Brilli v. Brilli, 283 App. Div. 905, 130 N.Y.S.2d 142 
(1954) (100 pounds): Rubin v. Elite Store Cleaners, Inc., 283 App. Div. 906, 1!10 N.Y.S.2d 
58 (1954) (100 poun~); Gioia v. A. J. Courtmel Co., 283 App. Div. 40, 126 N.Y.S.2d 
94 (1953) (100 pounds); Gostinsky v. Diamond Bake Shop, 11 App. Div. 2d 847, 203 
N.Y.S.2d 160 (1960) (105 pounds); Johnson v. Swift &: Co., 10 App. Div. 2d 656, 196 
N.Y.S.2d 330 (1960) (138 pounds); Chenier v. H. W. Rohlfs &: Son, 282 App. Div. 792, 122 
N.Y.S.2d 463 (1953) (150 pounds). 
66. Miller v. F. &: M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 718, 226 N.Y.S.2d 927 
(1962). 
67. Farber v. Harbor Shoes Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 578, 206 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1960), 
r~d on other grounds, 223 N.Y.S.2d 503, 179 N.E.2d 508 (1961). 
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and an armful of dishes, 68 to heavy barrels, 69 hot steel billets, 70 and 
an accident victim.71 Other types of exertion represented in success-
ful cases include changing a tire, 72 removing an automobile 
bumper,73 moving a machine,74 working in an awkward or cramped 
position,75 and general heavy strain.76 On the other hand, recovery 
has been denied in cases involving the lifting of things varying from 
a four to six pound briefcase77 to a fifty-pound nail keg.78 Compensa-
tion has also been denied for heart attacks attendant upon the work 
68. Burke v. Chef's Hat Restaurant, 16 App. Div. 2d 712, 226 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1962). 
69. Holly v. Queensboro Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 819, 192 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1959). 
70. Evans v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 838, 253 N.Y.S.2d 853 
(1964). 
71. Woodworth v. County of Onondaga-Sheriff's Dep't, 20 App. Div. 2d 945, 249 
N.Y.S.2d 239 (1964); cf. Stewart v. Devon Realty Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 1005, 189 
N.E.2d 626 (1963) (refuse cans); Sineni v. Sun Tire Sales-Phils Sunoco Service, 
271 N.Y.S.2d 335 (App. Div. 1966) (cans of anti-freeze); Mandelblatt v. Gold Star 
Baking Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 966,254 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1964), aff'd, 265 N.Y.S.2d 289, 212 
N.E.2d 775 (1965) (a bulky carton); Romanelli v. Hueblein Liquor Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 
980, 221 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1961) (cases of liquor); Katz v. Greenberg Flooring, Inc., 13 App. 
Div. 2d 561, 211 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1961) (lumber); Grear v. P. J. Garvey Carting &: Storage, 
Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 582, 200 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1960) (furniture); Silverman v. Calvert Coat 
Mfg. Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 973, 193 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1959) (bundles containing 45 coat 
sleeves); Wasserman v. Covington Fabrics Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 554, 189 N.Y.S.2d 503 
(1959) (heavy inventory books); Luongo v. Caristo Constr. Corp., 284 App. Div. 1078, 135 
N.Y.S.2d 821 (1954) (lumber); Sabasowitz v. Gold Theatre, 283 App. Div. 899, 130 
N.Y.S.2d 121 (1954) (a heavy case of motion picture film); Bingold v. Krebs, 282 App. 
Div. 786, 122 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1953) (a step ladder and two gallon cans of paint); Wolner 
v. Ronnie Bake Shop, Inc., 281 App. Div. 932, 119 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1953) (a heavy pail of 
water). 
72. O'Brien v. Long Island State Parkway Comm'n, 13 App. Div. 2d 855, 214 N.Y.S.2d 
786 (1961). See also the following cases which involved various kinds of pulling: Fisher 
v. Merrill Ann Creations, 13 App. Div. 2d 562, 212 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1961); Deutsch v. Garey, 
12 App. Div. 2d 830, 209 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1961); Hurt v. Bums Bros., 283 App. Div. 907, 
129 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1954); Rivers v. Malone .Bronze Powder Works, Inc., 277 App. Div. 
1071, 100 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1950). 
73. Baum v. B. &: .B. Auto Works, 15 App. Div. 2d 616, 222 N.Y.S.2d 559 (1961). 
74. Moses v. Steel Drum Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 864, 186 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1959); see the 
following cases which involved driving a truck or car: Grodsk.y v. Front St. Parking, 
Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 586, 212 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1961); Napolitano v. Fusco, 9 App. Div. 2d 
802, 192 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1959); Sanders v. Samuel Adler, Inc., 5 App. Div. 2d 1028, 173 
N.Y.S.2d 322 (1958); cf. Bleich v. 63rd Building Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 584, 221 N.Y.S.2d 
806 (1961) (removing snow); Jackson v • .Board of Educ., 12 App. Div. 2d 542, 206 N.Y.S.2d 
737 (1960) (removing snow). 
75. Cronberg v. Lenmar Holding Corp., 17 App. Div. 2d 885, 233 N.Y.S.2d 370 
(1962); Strickland v. Justice Motors, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 805, 192 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1959); 
Bahn v. Wolfensohn, Inc., 286 App. Div. 902, 142 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1955). 
76. Fish v. Smithville Volunteer Fire Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 573, 206 N.Y.S.2d 822 
(1960); Fisher v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 612, 151 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1956); Landy 
v. C. &: S. Plumbing Co., 284 App. Div. 918, 134 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1954). 
77. Goldman v. White&: Case, 9 N.Y.2d 763, 215 N.Y.S.2d 71, 174 N.E.2d 744 (1961); 
cf. Kane v. Canal Offset Plate Serv., Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 810, 263 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1965) 
(a batch of flats weighing 15 pounds); Botwinick v. Arnolds Men Shop, Inc., 12 App. 
Div. 2d 868, 210 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1961) (a 35-pound form). 
78. Burris v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.2d 323, 141 N.E.2d 424 (1957). 
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of cutting and attaching pipe,79 and upon the normal work of a 
mechanic. 80 
Another common cause of heart attacks encountered in com-
pensation cases is climbing. There have been numerous awards 
involving heart attacks caused by climbing both stairs81 and lad-
ders, 82 although there have also been some denials of claims arising 
out of such circumstances. 83 
I 
An increasingly prolific category of cases is that in which the 
causative element is found in excitement, fear, anger, worry, nervous 
strain, or tension caused by overwork, rather than in some physical 
exertion. Among the fact situations that have grounded awards are: 
an unusually heavy and strenuous period of litigation for an attor-
ney;84 the emotional strain of possible removal for failure to meet 
a project deadline coupled with worry about incurring excessive 
costs;85 an argument with the employee's superior;86 the excitement 
of a night watchman observing suspicious acts of two men;87 and the 
79. Bobb v. Weaderhorn Constr. Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 888, 186 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1959). 
80. Hawthorne v. Eagle Delivery Truck Renting Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 824, 247 
N.Y.S.2d 448 (1964). 
81. E.g., Himovitch v. Chiaet Ornamental Iron Works, 24 App. Div. 2d 799, 263 
N.Y.S.2d 971 (1965); Nutis v. Saloway's Restaurant, 16 App. Div. 2d 846, 227 N.Y.S.2d 
591 (1962); Corso v. Tandy &: Allen Associates, 10 App. Div. 2d 741, 197 N.Y.S.2d 510 
(1960); Riccobono v. Continental Cas. Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 718, 152 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1956); 
Neyman v. Charlie Baker Clothier, 283 App. Div. 755, 128 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1954); Klein v. 
Louis Candel, Inc., 280 App. Div. 1029, 116 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1952); Kehoe v. London 
Guar. &: Acc. Ins. Co., 278 App. Div. 731, 103 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1951). 
82. E.g., Hannonay v. Hannonay, 24 App. Div. 2d 800, 263 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1965); 
Hutton v. Ford Motor Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 589, 189 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1959). 
83. E.g., Bloom v. Israel Cohen &: Son, 16 App. Div. 2d 841, 227 N.Y.S.2d 747 
(1962) (stairs); O'Brien v. Ronneberg, 8 App. Div. 2d 880, 186 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1959) 
(ladder). 
84. Schechter v. State Ins. Fund, 6 N.Y.2d 506, 160 N.E.2d 901 (1959); cf. Goodwin v. 
Workmen's Compensation Bd., 20 App. Div. 2d 951,249 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1964) (a workmen's 
compensation referee who had to handle an extra case load and deal with several 
emotional claimants); Mueller v. Rutgers Club, Inc., 278 App. Div. 619, 101 N.Y.S.2d 
953 (1951) (long hours and unusual excitement causing the death of a social club 
steward). 
85. Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 551, 207 N.Y.S.2d 72 
(1960), rev'd, 10 N.Y.2d 209,219 N.Y.S.2d 14, 176 N.E.2d 714 (1961); cf. Ferreri v. General 
Auto Driving School, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 601, 271 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1966) (suspended 
inspector on way to take lie detector test); Hamilton v. Transport Workers Union, 21 
App. Div. 2d 434, 251 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1964) (the emotional strain of a union employee 
caused by a hearing concerning his alleged malfeasance). 
86. Wilson v. Tippetts-Abbott-McCarthy-Stratton, 22 App. Div. 2d 720, 253 N.Y.S.2d 
149 (1964); Chavkin v. Rotter, 20 App. Div. 2d 158, 245 N.Y.S.2d 435 {1963). 
87. Albarella v. Glick Dev., Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 920, 244 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1963); cf, 
Lohman v. Bernhard Altmann Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 931, 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1963) (the 
strain of a promotional trip on a sales manager); Antonini v. Progressive Electronics, 15 
App. Div. 2d 842,224 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1962) (fright when awakening to find one's truck on 
fire); Cappozalo v. City Housing Authority, 1 App. Div. 2d 709, 146 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1955) 
(the stress of conducting lectures without the usual assistance). 
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strain of attempting to avoid a traffic accident. 88 Perhaps because of 
the somewhat more elusive nature of emotional causation, the pro-
portion of denials of recovery is higher in this category than in the 
others. Thus, there are unsuccessful cases involving hard-working 
attomeys,89 emotion-ridden bookkeepers,90 and tension-racked busi-
ness executives.91 In addition, there are a number of frustrated 
claims which were based on arguments92 and altercations.93 
This catalog of heart cases arranged according to factual back-
ground may be concluded by a brief reference to a category which-
at least as to its ability to satisfy the "by accident" concept-is one 
of the least controversial: that in which the heart failure is asso-
ciated with some obvious mishap, such as a trauma,94 a fall,95 or a 
slip.06 
B. The Legal Tests 
We are now ready to attempt to decipher the pattern of legal 
tests that lies buried in this mass of cases. These tests are to be found 
partly in the occasional efforts of the New York courts to verbalize 
their rules and partly in the mosaic made by their actual decisions, 
a large proportion of which announce a result based on the partic-
ular facts without providing any specific articulation of the legal 
principle which is being applied. 
The clue to understanding the current state of the law in New 
York is the realization that, while the courts still insist upon some 
kind of "unusualness" in the precipitating event, that unusualness 
can take at least two, and perhaps three, different forms. The word 
"unusual" is a relative term; the event must therefore be unusual 
88. Eckhaus v. Adeck Stores, Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 569, 200 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1960), rev'd, 
11 N.Y.2d 862, 227 N.Y.S.2d 680, 182 N.E.2d 287 (1962); Wiltcher v. National Transp. Co., 
283 App. Div. 977, 130 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1954). 
89. Greenfield v. Goldrich, 271 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1966); Gallagher v. County of Oswego, 
14 App. Div. 2d 463, 216 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1961). 
90. Roth v. Model Pawnbrokers, 16 App. Div. 2d 841, 227 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1962). See 
also Gordon v. Temple Beth El, 18 App. Div. 2d 855, 236 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1963), afj'd, 
14 N.Y.2d 742, 199 N.E.2d 508, 250 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1964). 
91. Lesnik v. National Carloading Corp., 285 App. Div. 649, 140 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1955), 
afj'd, 309 N.Y. 958, 132 N.E.2d 326 (1956). 
92. Cramer v. Barney's Clothing Store, 13 N.Y.2d 711, 191 N.E.2d 901, 241 N.Y.S.2d 
844 (1963); Zygler v. Tenzer Coat Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 660, 240 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1963), afj'd, 
15 N.Y.2d 562,203 N.E.2d 217,254 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1964); Coleman v. Guide-Kalkhoff-Burr, 
Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 857, 178 N.E.2d 912, 222 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1961); Santacroce v. 40 W. 20th 
St., Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 855, 178 N.E.2d 912, 222 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1961). 
93. Unterberg v. Department of Labor, 16 App. Div. 2d 668, 242 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1963). 
94. De Luca v. Garrett &: Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 569, 206 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1960). 
95. Friedman v. Fada, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 866, 209 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1961). 
96. Wasserman v. Covington Fabrics Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 554, 189 N.Y.S.2d 503 
(1959). 
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in relation to some specified norm which is accepted as "usual." 
While a large number of New York cases use the word "unusual" 
without identifying the norm taken as "usual," there are a sufficient 
number of cases specifying the benchmark of "usualness" to support 
the following breakdown: 
An event (exertion, excitement, etc.) is sufficiently un-
usual to impart accidental character if it is unusual in rela-
tion to any one of the three following norms: 
(a) The employee's own usual work; 
(b) The "wear and tear" of ordinary non-employment 
life; or 
(c) The usual work of other employees. 
The addition of test (b) is the most significant development 
since the Masse case in the refinement of the New York rule. The 
test seems to be traceable to the case of Burris v. Lewis,97 which dem-
onstrated that, while Masse would permit an award even though the 
claimant had merely been engaged in his regular duties, Masse 
did not open the floodgates to permit awards for the results of any 
exertion, however ordinary. Rather, the New York Court of Appeals 
read Masse as meaning that an exertion which was regular and 
routine in relation to an employee's usual employment duties could 
be the basis of an award if, and only if, it was greater than the ordi-
nary wear and tear of non-employment life.98 The court also scrupu-
lously insisted on the medical causation factor by adding that the 
heart attack must be shown to have been caused by the unusually 
hard work thus demanded. 
The Masse case decided that the,. precipitating cause need not be 
something more strenuous than the normal performance of the work 
demanded, provided that the ordinary course of the work was suffi-
ciently strenuous to require more than normal exertion. But where, 
as here, a heart has deteriorated so that any exertion becomes an 
overexertion, where the mere circumstance that the employee was 
engaged in some kind of physical labor is what impels the doctor 
to testify that his work caused his death, we would have reached a 
point, if this award were to be upheld, where all that is necessary 
to sustain an award is that the employee shall have died of heart 
disease.99 
97. 2 N.Y.2d 323, 141 N.E.2d 424 (1957). 
98. See also Carrasquillo v. Santini Bros.-The Original, 13 N.Y.2d 245, 196 N.E.2d 
52, 246 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1963); Stein v. 200 Lafayette St. Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 996, 254 
N.Y.S.2d 956 (1964); Jackson v. Board of Educ., 12 App. Div. 2d 542, 206 N.Y.S.2d 737 
(1960). 
99. 2 N.Y.2d at 326, 141 N.E.2d at 426. 
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The "wear and tear" rule has been pressed into service in New 
York since 1957 both to support awards100 and to defeat them.101 
This test appears to be aimed essentially at distinguishing between 
heart attacks that are the result of the "natural progression" of 
heart disease and those that are not, and the distinction is sometimes 
explicitly phrased in these terms, both in awards,102 and in de-
nials.103 However, it must be stressed that the "wear and tear" rule 
has not displaced the rule that heart attacks are compensable when 
caused by exertion greater than that normally required of the em-
ployee; the new rule merely supplements the old, or forms an excep-
tion to it. In other words, it is only necessary to appeal to the "wear 
and tear" rule when the facts show no more than regular exertion 
in the employee's normal activities. 
The fact that the new test is an alternative is amply demonstrated 
by the large number of awards that are still made on the basis of 
unusualness in relation to the employee's own regular work. This 
unusualness can take many forms. An obvious example is the case 
in which, at the time of his heart attack, the employee was engaged 
in duties that were themselves different from or in addition to his 
normal duties. Now and then an executive or salesman, not tough-
ened to the demands of muscular exertion by his accustomed seden-
tary or verbal activities, has occasion to lift some object whose 
weight proves to be too much for him.104 But unusualness may also 
be found when the shift is from one kind of physical work to an-
other, as from watering Ia-wns to pitching leaves into a truck,105 or 
100. E.g., Dodson v. Frank Vanecek &: Son, 24 App. Div. 2d 787, 263 N.Y.S.2d 774 
(1965); Lerner v. Terrycab Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 615, 245 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1963); Shefick v. 
Lefrak, 11 App. Div. 2d 828, 202 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1960); Burke v. New York World 
Telegram &: Sun, 10 App. Div. 2d 742, 198 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1960); Johnson v. Swift &: Co., 
10 App. Div. 2d 656, 196 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1960); Gibalski v. Elmira Country Club, 8 App. 
Div. 2d 883, 187 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1959); Moses v. Steel Drum Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 864, 186 
N.Y.S.2d 953 (1959). 
101. E.g., Goldman v. White &: Case, 9 N.Y.2d 763, 174 N.E.2d 744, 215 N.Y.S.2d 71 
(1961); Burris v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.2d 323, 141 N.E.2d 424 (1957); Hawthorne v. Eagle 
Delivery Truck Renting Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 824, 247 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1964); O'.Brien v. 
Ronneberg, 8 App. Div. 2d 880, 186 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1959). 
102. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bedford Prod. Div., Nat'l Dairy Prod. Corp., 15 App. Div. 
2d 31, 221 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1961); Moses v. Steel Drum Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 864, 186 
N.Y.S.2d 953 (1959). 
103. See, e.g., .Bloom v. Israel Cohen &: Son, 16 App. Div. 2d 841, 227 N.Y.S.2d 747 
(1962); Bobb v. Weaderhom Constr. Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 888, 186 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1959). 
104. Adler v. N. Adler's Son, Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 1050, 265 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1965): 
Witten v. Sargoy &: Stein, 15 App. Div. 2d 617, 222 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961); O'Brien v. Long 
Island State Parkway Comm'n, 13 App. Div. 2d 855, 214 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1961); Gordon v. 
Cenu Fibres, 10 App. Div. 2d 655, 196 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1960); Ertle v. Morris Ertle, Inc., 9 
App. Div. 2d 797, 192 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1959); Sabasowitz v. Gold Theatre, 283 App. Div. 
899, ll!O N.Y.S.2d 121 (1954). 
105. Gibalski v. Elmira Country Club, 8 App. Div. 2d 883, 187 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1959). 
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from a carpenter's repair and alteration work to the operating of a 
mortising machine.106 In one interesting case, the comparison was 
made not with the normal demands of the employee's present job, 
but rather with the demands of his previous job; an award was ac-
cordingly made for the death of a bulldozer operator who, two weeks 
earlier, had the less strenuous job of an oiler.107 Somewhat less 
obviously unusual is the performance of a task or exertion which, 
while not of frequent occurrence, does recur with some degree of 
regularity. For example, one employee had extra duties each 
Wednesday evening and had a fatal heart attack after one such 
evening's work.108 Another had a heart attack as the result of an 
activity he normally undertook once a month.109 Compensation was 
awarded in both instances. It is thus quite clear that unusualness 
may be a matter of degree, as well as of kind.110 It may appear in the 
duration,111 strenuousness,112 distance,113 or other circumstances114 
involved in the execution of routine assignments. 
Three norms were mentioned above as operating side by side 
when the usualness of an exertion is determined in New York: the 
employee's own normal strain; the wear and tear of non-employment 
life; and the normal strain of other employees. The vast majority of 
the cases fall within the first two categories. The third is illustrated by 
a pair of cases involving emotional strain. In one, the heart failure 
was allegedly caused by the employee's argument with a superior. 
Compensation was denied on the express ground that the emotional 
106. Clayback v. Globe Woven Belting Co., 282 App. Div. 973, 125 N.Y.S.2d 493 
(1953). 
107. Hudson v. Waddington Constr., 14 App. Div. 2d 463, 217 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1961). 
108. Domash v. Standard Coat, Apron & Linen Serv., 11 App. Div. 2d 575, 201 
N.Y.S.2d 142 (1960), afj'd, 9 N.Y.2d 889, 175 N.E.2d 831, 216 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1961). See also 
Kushner v. Landau, Newman & Rosen, 13 App. Div. 2d 564, 211 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1961). 
109. Wheaton v. Chevrolet-Buffalo Div. of General Motors Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 
591, 189 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1959); cf. Deutsch v. H. & S. Dairy Prod., Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 
845, 209 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1961); Bottke v. Globe Stationery & Toy Co., 278 App. Div. 621, 
101 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1951). 
110. See Schechter v. State Ins. Fund, 6 N.Y.2d 506, 160 N.E.2d 901 (1959). 
111. Martinelli v. Metropolis Trucking Co., 8 N.Y.2d 806, 168 N.E.2d 254 (1960). 
Johnson v. Gristede Bros., 278 App, Div. 732, 103 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1951), on the authority 
of Westbrook v. Southside Sportmen's Club, 274 App. Div. 954, 83 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1948), 
afj'd, 299 N.Y. 748, 87 N.E.2d 669 (1949). 
112. Carpenter v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 302 N.Y. 304, 97 N.E.2d 915 (1951); 
Brilli v. Brilli, 283 App. Div. 905, 130 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1954). 
113. Burke v. New York World Telegram & Sun, 10 App. Div. 2d 742, 198 N.Y.S.2d 
108 (1960). 
114. Brocklebank v. Union Carbide Int'I Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 1009, 234 N.Y.S.2d 
69 (1962), afj'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1036, 195 N.E.2d 313, 245 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1963); Burke v. Chef's 
Hat Restaurant, 16 App. Div. 2d 712, 226 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1962); Sanders v. Samuel Adler, 
Inc., 5 App. Div. 2d 1028, 173 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1958); Sleator v. National City Banlc, 285 
App. Div. 393, 137 N.Y.S.2d 289, afj'd, 309 N.Y. 708, 128 N.E.2d 415 (1955). 
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strain involved was no greater than that to which all workers are 
subjected.ms Three years later, in another case involving an argu-
ment with a superior-this one conducted through an intermediary 
located midway between the parties--compensation was awarded 
on the express ground that there was "greater emotional strain or 
tension than that to which all workers are occasionally subjected."116 
It is difficult to see how a test based on the "normal strain of all other 
employees" could be successfully extrapolated beyond the immediate 
fact situation, that of emotional stress growing out of a work argu-
ment. Even in that situation, it is a questionable norm; for is there 
some :fixed measurable quantity of emotional tension common to all 
employments? In any event, there is plainly no such fixed quantity 
as to physical exertion, such as lifting or climbing. In short, it is 
doubtful that the already complex law as to the compensability of 
heart attacks is enriched or clarified by adding this third norm to 
the tests based on the employee's own normal strain and on the 
stress of non-employment life. 
IV. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
We have traced in some detail the experience of one major juris-
diction which abruptly reversed its rule from the unusual-exertion 
rule to the usual-exertion and accidental-result formula, and of 
another major jurisdiction which has demonstrated both the prob-
lems created by the unusual-exertion test and the need for a more 
sophisticated criterion. We may now attempt a critical appraisal of 
the competing doctrines. The central question is whether the un-
usual-exertion test is a valid and workable test by which to deter-
mine the accidental character of an injury. It is subject to criticism 
on three grounds. 
The first is its assumption that the accidental character of an 
injury must be found in the cause rather than in the result. Except 
when express statutory language inserts some such requirement,117 
there is nothing in the "accident" concept which demands this 
limitation, and, as shown above, the accidental-result interpretation 
115. Santacroce v. 40 W. 20th St., Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 855, 222 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1961), 
116. Wilson v. Tippetts, 22 App. Div. 2d 720, 721, 253 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 (1964). 
117. The 1961 amendments to MoNT, R.Ev. CoDE5 ANN. § 92-418 (1947) define an 
injury as happening "from an unexpected cause." The prior wording referred to "some 
fortuitous event." See also statutes expressly adopting the unexpected or accidental 
result theory: "'[A]ccident' shall mean only an unexpected or unusual event or result." 
Fu. STAT. § 440 (1965). Ohio has defined injury as: "any injury, whether caused by 
accidental means or accidental in character and result." Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 
(Page 1965). (Emphasis added.) 
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was already well embedded in the phrase "by accident" by the time 
the phrase was taken over by the states from the British Act.118 
Georgia is a good example of a state which has carried to its ultimate 
expression the reasoning that an unexpected result is sufficient to 
supply the accidental element, whether the cause is extraordinary or 
not.119 It adopted the following formula: "An accident arises out of 
the employment when the required exertion producing the accident 
is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree 
of exertion or the condition of health."120 In one case in which this 
rule was applied, the Georgia court actually deemed accidental a 
heart failure following exertion which was lighter than usual, since 
the exertion did in fact precipitate the attack.121 In this case, the 
decedent had asked to be put on less strenuous work because he was 
not feeling well, and at the time of his death he was only carrying 
one-by-four boards, none of which weighed over twenty pounds-
about the weight of a portable typewriter or a pail of water. Yet it 
was established by the medical testimony that, because of his ex-
tremely bad heart condition, even this exertion was capable of pre-
cipitating the collapse. In the same month, Georgia also awarded 
compensation for a heart attack suffered five minutes after a book-
keeper had walked up a single flight of stairs to his offi.ce.122 
The second criticism of the unusual-exertion requirement-an 
equally elementary criticism going to the plain meaning of the word 
"accident"-involves the assumption that whatever is unusual is 
accidental. Whether one takes the everyday colloquial meaning or 
the most technical dictionary meaning of the term accidental, this 
assumption is not true. Whether a thing is accidental depends on 
whether it is unexpected or unintended. One can deliberately do the 
unusual and one often does. If an employee intentionally and know-
ingly undertakes to lift an unusual load, the lifting is no more ac-
cidental than if he had deliberately lifted a normal load. Or if a 
gardener deliberately continues to mow the law in the rain,123 an 
observer would not say that the gardener was experiencing an ac-
cident merely because it is unusual to mow lawns in the rain. Yet on 
118. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text. 
119. See Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co. v. Pulliam, 99 Ga. App. 406, 108 S.E.2d 823 (1959); 
Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 67 Ga. App. 649, 21 S.E.2d 478 (1952). 
120. Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 67 Ga. App. 649, 653, 21 S.E.2d 478, 481 (1952); 
accord, Triebsch v. Athletic Mining&: Smelting Co., 218 Ark. 379, 237 S.W.2d 26 (1951). 
121, Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Kitchens, 81 Ga. App. 470, 59 S.E.2d 270 (1950). 
122, Bussey v. Globe Indem. Co., 81 Ga. App. 401, 59 S.E.2d 34 (1950). 
123. See Dotola v. Hill, 257 App. Div. 870, 11 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1939) (held, contraction 
of sciatica accidental under such circumstances). 
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this broken reed-the identification of unusual with accidental-
lean the hundreds of cases that have swollen the compensation re-
ports with distinctions between the usual and the unusual in working 
conditions. 
The third criticism is that, in practice, the usual-unusual distinc-
tion is unworkable. The distinction assumes that there is a quantum 
of exertion or exposure in any occupation which is usual or normal 
-an assumption which is questionable at best, and certainly difficult 
to apply. Any employee looking forward to his coming year's work 
knows that he will work long hours as well as short hours, in cold 
weather as well as hot, sometimes faster and sometimes more 
slowly.124 The butcher will lift both light and heavy sides of beef, 
and one day he will encounter the heaviest side of beef he has lifted 
all year. Will that be a usual lift?125 The fireman will have easy fires 
and difficult fires; the loader will lift little boxes and bigger boxes 
and biggest boxes; the policeman will arrest complaisant drunks and 
difficult drunks.128 None of this is either unusual or unexpected; 
yet a surprising number of cases will hold an exertion unusual when 
it is nothing more than the heaviest part of the claimant's usual 
work.121 
Holmes' statement that the life of the law has been not logic but 
experience is probably truer in compensation law than in any other 
field. Although most of the law built up around ,the "accident" re-
quirement, for example, has been based on false premises and em-
broidered with irrelevant distinctions, there has been a utilitarian 
purpose behind it all which cannot be disregarded when all of the 
logical criticisms have been exhausted. That practical considera-
tion is the fear that heart and related cases will get out of control, 
and will become compensable whenever they take place within the 
time and space limits of employment, unless some kind of arbitrary 
boundaries are set. Most states have chosen to press the "accident" 
124. See Walsh v. United States Rubber Co., 238 S.C. 411, 120 S.E.2d 685 (1961), in 
which the claimant suffered a heart attack. The court found that continual interrup• 
tion by the claimant's superiors, who ordered him to abandon his usual duties as stock• 
man in order to fetch special materials, constituted unusual exertion when he tried to 
"double-up" in order to get his regular work done by the end of the day and compen-
sation was awarded. 
125. Industrial Comm'n v. Luger, 54 Ohio. App. 148, 6 N.E.2d 573 (1936) (held, 
accidental). 
126. See De Esch v. :Borough of Emmaus, 143 Pa. Super. 225, 18 A.2d 89 (1941) 
(held, coronary thrombosis accidental). 
127. See, e.g., York v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 131 Pa. Super. 496, 200 Atl. 230 
(1938), in which compensation was awarded because, although dumping cars was the 
miner's usual work, it was the hardest part of it. 
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concept into service as one of these arbitrary boundaries, but, with 
a few exceptions, one gets the impression that what is behind it all 
is not so much an insistence on accidental quality for its own sake 
as the provision of an added assurance that compensation will not 
be awarded for deaths not really caused in any substantial degree 
by the employment. 
Unfortunately, the unusual-exertion requirement is a clumsy and 
ill-fitting device with which to ensure causal connection, although 
it undoubtedly does frequently rule out cases in which work-con-
nection is questionable. The fallacy of testing work-connection by 
a comparison of a man's particular fatal exertion with his usual 
exertion is that, in many occupations, even the usual exertion is 
clearly capable of causing the heart collapse. Conversely, in many 
occupations the usual exertion requires so little effort that, even 
when it is exceeded, it is medically improbable that the "unusual" 
exertion could cause heart failure. It is not ~s though continuous 
heavy work over a long period produced a strong heart, while desk 
work for the same period resulted in a weak heart. The longshore-
man and the salesman may have hearts which, weakened by disease, 
are no different in their ability to withstand strain. In Philadel-
phia Dairy Products Company v. Farran,128 a salesman indulged in 
the (for him) unusual effort of carrying a fifteen-pound parcel, while 
the claimant in Marlowe v. Huron Mountain Club129 lifted 200-
pound sacks of mail, which for him was routine. Farran got compen-
sation; Marlowe did not. The point is that, as a matter of medical 
causation, the only question is the ability of the particular strain 
to affect the particular diseased heart; the character of the claimant's 
previous exertions is of much less relevance to this issue than is the 
medical question whether, given this heart and this exertion, the 
exertion in fact contributed to the collapse. One would assume that 
a causal connection could more readily be shown when the object 
lifted was 200 pounds than when it was fifteen. 
V. A SUGGESTED SOLUTION 
The beginning point in any attempt to articulate a sound work-
ing rule for the heart cases is the recognition of the fact that, while 
limits must be put on heart liability, the essence of the problem 
128. 44 Del. 380, 57 A.2d 88 (Super. Ct.), afj'd, 44 Del. 437, 61 A.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 
1948). 
129. 271 Mich. 107, 260 N.W. 130 (1935). Marlowe was decided under the earlier 
Michigan rule. See notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text, 
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is causation. The fact that an increasing number of jurisdictions 
accept this beginning point is a step in the right direction, but 
there is one additional preliminary step which is indispensable to 
an orderly analysis, and that is (o recognize that the causation ques-
tion has two distinct parts: the legal and the medical. The law must 
define what kind of exertion satisfies the test of "arising out of the 
employment"; then the doctors must say whether the exertion which 
has been held legally sufficient to support compensation has in fact 
caused the heart attack. All too often these two tests are scrambled 
together. When this happens, the courts usually lose sight of one 
of them. Thus, obsession with the legal test of unusual exertion may 
lead to a holding that a very slight exertion, because it satisfies the 
legal test in that it is unusual for the particular employee, is ade-
quate to support an award, although its ability to account medi-
cally for the collapse seems remote. Conversely, obsession with medi-
cal causation sometimes leads to a slighting of the need for precision 
in defining the legal rule, with the result that decisions may be based 
on statements by doctors that an exertion did or did not cause a 
heart attack, although neither the doctors nor the lawyers may have 
had a clear concept of what the term "cause" meant in this setting. 
The first task, then, is to state plainly the legal test of causation. 
If we can keep to one side the complications that have been intro-
duced by attempts to cram this problem into the "accident" mold, 
we will see that the causation issue can be solved by invoking the 
distinction which exists in compensation law between neutral-risk 
situations (where there is no obvious personal or employment ele-
ment contributing to the risk) and personal-risk situations (where 
a personal risk contributes to the injury, although perhaps in a 
relatively small degree).130 As to situations which do not involve any 
personal risk element, the better rule goes beyond the old rule, 
which demanded that the employment contribute an increased 
or peculiar risk, and accepts actual risk,131 or even positional risk.132 
The reason is that there is no competing personal risk to overcome. 
Any employment contribution, even merely putting the employee 
in the place where the injury from a neutral force occurred, is 
enough, because it is greater than the zero employee contribution. 
But when the employee contributes some personal element of risk 
-e.g., by having a personal enemy who assaults him,133 or a personal 
1!10. See 1 LARsoN, I.Aw OF WORK.MEN'S COMPENSATION § 7 (1965). 
1!11. Id. §§ 8.43 & 9.40. 
132. Id. § IO. 
133. Id. § 11.23. 
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disease which figures causally in his injury184-the employment must 
contribute something substantial to increase the risk. The reason 
is that the employment risk must offset the causal contribution of 
the personal risk. The result in idiopathic fall cases in most jurisdic-
tions is that there is no compensation unless some height or object 
associated with the work adds to the risk.185 
In heart cases, the effect of applying this distinction between 
neutral-risk and personal-risk situations would be clear. If there is 
some personal causal contribution in the form of a previously weak-
ened or diseased heart, a heart attack would be compensable only if 
the employment contribution takes the form of an exertion greater 
than that of non-employment life. Note that the comparison is not 
with this employee's usual exertion in his employment, but rather 
with the exertions present in the normal non-employment life of this 
or any other person. On the other hand, if there is no personal causal 
contribution, that is, if there is no prior weakness or disease, any 
exertion connected with the employment and causally connected 
with the collapse as a matter of medical fact would be adequate to 
satisfy the legal test of causation. This is the heart-case application 
of the actual risk test: this exertion in fact causally contributed to 
this collapse. In both situations, whether or not there was prior per-
sonal weakness or disease, the claimant would also have to show that 
medically the particular exertion contributed causally to the heart 
attack. 
To highlight the difference in practice between the old unusual-
exertion test and the suggested rule, let us postulate two extreme 
cases. Suppose first that X's job involves the frequent lifting of 200-
pound bags, and that one such 200-pound lift medically produces a 
heart attack. Under the old unusual-exertion rule there would be no 
compensation, regardless of any previously existing heart condition, 
because the activity was not unusual for X.136 Under the suggested 
rule there would be compensation, even in the presence of a history 
of heart disease, because people generally do not lift 200-pound 
weights as a part of non-employment life, and therefore the em-
ployment contributed a strain which was beyond the ordinary wear 
and tear of life. At the other extreme, suppose that Y's usual job in-
134. Id. §§ 12.10-.14. 
135. Id. § 12.14. 
136. See Marlowe v. Huron Mountain Club, 271 Mich. 107, 260 N.W. Ul0 (1935). 
See also Latimer v. Sevier County Farmers Co-op., Inc., 233 Ark. 762, 346 S,W.2d 673 
(1961), in which lifting four 100-pound sacks was insufficient evidence of a causal 
relation between the employment and a fatal coronary thrombosis. 
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volves no lifting. Suppose he lifts a fifteen-pound weight on the job, 
and suppose there is medical testimony that this lift caused his 
heart attack. Under the old test, which was concerned exclu-
sively with the comparison between an employee's usual exertions 
and the precipitating exertion, there would be compensation.137 
Under the suggested rule, the result would depend on whether there 
was a personal causal element in the form of a previously weakened 
heart. If there was no history of heart disease, compensation would 
be awarded since the employment contributed something to the 
employee's collapse and his personal life contributed nothing. If the 
employee had a previously weakened heart, compensation would be 
denied in spite of the medical causal contribution of his employ-
ment, because legally the personal causal contribution was substan-
tial, while the employment added nothing to the usual wear and tear 
of life-which certainly includes lifting objects weighing 15 pounds, 
such as bags of golf clubs, step ladders, or sets of The Law of Work-
men's Compensation (with Annual Supplement).138 
The suggested rule has borrowed from the most recent New 
York test, the "wear and tear" concept. The decisive advance 
over the old unusual-exertion test is the alteration in the norm 
of exertion with which the precipitating exertion is compared. 
The old norm was the particular employee's usual exertion. The 
new norm is the exertion of ordinary non-employment life. What 
New York now must do, in order to bring its heart case story to an 
orderly conclusion, is hold that the "wear and tear" rule applies only 
in cases of prior heart weakness, adapt its own actual-risk test to all 
other cases by giving awards in these cases for heart attacks caused 
by usual exertion, and sweep away the vestiges of the old unusual-
exertion-for-this-employee test. 
As for Michigan, its energies have been so thoroughly devoted 
to the one gigantic effort of throwing off the unsual-exertion 
requirement that it has hardly had time to face the more sub-
tle problems of keeping the heart cases within appropriate bound-
137. See Philadelphia Dairy Prods. Co. v. Farran, 44 Del. 380, 57 A.2d 88 (Super Ct.), 
aff'd, 44 Del. 437, 61 A.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1948). 
1118. It is this feature that distinguishes the proposed rule from the rule that accepts 
in all heart cases any exertion as long as medical causation is shown. In other words, 
under the proposed rule, there will be cases in which employment exertion was 
medically capable of accounting for the collapse, and in which denials will neverthe-
less result because the exertion docs not rise above the "wear and tear of life" level. 
See, e.g., Di Cicco v. Liebmann Breweries, Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 613, 201 N.Y.S.2d 123 
(1960), in which medical testimony that any effort would trigger the fatal attack re-
sulted in the court denying the compensation award because the ordinary wear and 
tear of life would have produced the same result. 
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aries without the aid of the unusual-exertion test. However, one 
point should be emphasized immediately to dispel any apparent 
inconsistency between the proposed solution and some passages in 
the Sheppard case. In that case, the Michigan Supreme Court went 
to considerable lengths to denounce and destroy the distinction 
between cases involving previous disease and weakness, and cases 
involving previously healthy claimants. However, it condemned this 
distinction specifically for the purpose of demonstrating, quite cor-
rectly, that there should not be a difference in the "by accident" rule 
applicable to the two types of cases. The point of the distinction 
between previously healthy and previously diseased claimants in 
the rule suggested in this article is purely one of causation. 
Clearly there should not be one "by accident" rule for workers 
with prior heart disease and another for those with no such history. 
Equally clearly, it would be unrealistic to deny that the presence 
or absence of pre-existing heart disease has relevance in determin-
ing whether the final heart collapse was causally related to the em-
ployment or occurred merely by coincidence during working hours. 
If the workman had a previously healthy heart, the question whether 
the heart attack was simply the result of the natural progression of 
the disease could not arise, while, in a case involving advanced heart 
deterioration, the causal contribution of the personal pre-existing 
disease may loom so large that it blots out any possible finding of 
employment causation. 
After the resolution of this question about Sheppard, there should 
be no particular difficulty in adopting the suggested rule in Michigan. 
The controversial cases until now have been wrestling primarily 
with the accident concept and can be distinguished on that ground, 
whereas the suggested rule constitutes merely an adaptation and 
refinement of basic principles drawn from the words "arising out of 
... employment." Indeed, the same route for the adoption of the 
proposed rule is open to practically every other jurisdiction, whether 
it has already accepted the usual-exertion test or whether it is merely 
ripe for such a change. 
It must be recognized that the proposed rule raises one prob-
lem: in close cases a great deal necessarily turns on the question 
whether there was a pre-existing disease or weakness. If, as in a large 
proportion of claims, there is a provable history of heart disease, 
the resolution of this question presents little difficulty. But when 
there is no provable history of heart disease, doctors may still say 
that there must have been such a history, on the theory that a healthy 
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heart could not have given way under the particular exertion.189 
All that can be said here is that this has to be a determination of 
medical fact. Presumably the burden of proof would be upon the 
party alleging the existence of a prior heart condition as a fact 
essential to his case. More frequent use of autopsies, when possible, 
may be justified in cases in which this issue can be foreseen. Some-
times an autopsy can be distinctly helpful, as, for example, in the 
Burris140 case, where the autopsy revealed no new lesions--only old 
ones. 
Under the proposed solution, the decisional law on heart cases 
should not be substantially different under a "by accident" statute 
than under statutes like those of California, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Texas, which do not contain such 
words in their coverage tests.141 If any court is disposed to worry 
about whether abandoning the unusual-exertion test would "open 
the flood gates,"142 it might find reassurance in the fact that getting 
an exertion award in such states as California,143 Iowa,144 Massachu-
setts,145 Minnesota,146 and Rhode Island147 is no "pushover." In those 
states, the difference is that the battle is avowedly fought on the fun-
damental causation issue.148 
Up to this point, our concern has been with the first half of the 
139. See, e.g., the inconclusive posture of this question in Coombe v. Penegor, 348 
Micb. 6!15, 83 N.W.2d 603 (1957). The question is not settled by the opinion itself, but 
we find the following reference to the problem in the opinion of Justice Smith in 
Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 604, 83 N.W.2d 614, 626 (1957): 
A majority is also affirming Ewart Coombe's award. Did he have a pre-existing 
ailment? His attending doctor says he "must" have had. The appeal board says 
he "may" have had. The defendants say he did have. Notwithstanding, it is pro-
posed that his award of compensation under part 2 be affirmed. Authority? Eula 
Sheppard's case. Apparently it is no longer critical whether there was a pre-existing 
"disease or condition" or not. We agree. It never was. 
140. Burris v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.2d 323, 141 N.E.2d 424 (1957). 
141. See note 1 supra. 
142. See the comment of Judge Latimer in his dissent in Purity Biscuit Company 
that the rule in that case "opens the flood gates and every internal failure becomes an 
accident just because it happens." Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 
1, 30, 201 P.2d 961, 975 (1949). 
14!1. See, e.g., denials of compensation in Daniels v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 148 
Cal. App. 2d 500,306 P.2d 905 (1957); Lancaster v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 5 Cal. App. 
2d 304, 42 P.2d 3!13 (1935); Quail v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 138 Cal. App. 412, 32 P.2d 
402 (19!14); McNamara v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 130 Cal. App. 284, 20 P.2d 53 (1933); 
Singlaub v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 87 Cal. App. 324, 262 Pac. 411 (1927). 
144. See, e.g., Hemker v. Drobney, 253 Iowa 421, 112 N.W.2d 672 (1962); Lindahl v. 
L. O. Boggs Co., 236 Iowa 296, 18 N.W.2d 607 (1945). 
145. See, e.g., Herlihy's Case, 267 Mass. 232, 166 N.E. 556 (1929). 
146. See, e.g., Schuppel v. United Van Bus Co., 257 Minn. 444, 102 N.W.2d 24 
(1960). 
147. See, e.g., Williams v. United Wire&: Supply Corp., 194 A.2d 686 (R.I. 1963). 
148. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 2d 555, 
166 P.2d 908 (1946). 
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proposed causation test in exertion cases: the question of the degree 
of exertion necessary to satisfy the legal test of work-connection. We 
now come to the second half of the test: the question whether, as a 
matter of medical fact, the exertion contributed causally to the 
collapse. A good statement of the need for medical-factual causal 
connection has been supplied by the Supreme Court of Georgia: 
[I]t must be shown by evidence, opinion or otherwise, that the 
exertion attendant upon the duties of employment, no matter how 
slight or how strenuous, and no matter with what other factors-
such as preexisting disease or predisposition to attack-it may be 
combined, was sufficient to contribute toward the precipitation of 
the attack. Where evidence as to the work engaged in shows it to 
be sufficiently strenuous, or of such a nature that, combined with 
the other facts of the case, it raises a natural inference through 
human experience that it did so contribute, this is sufficient. In 
other cases, the opinions of experts that the exertion shown by the 
evidence to exist would be sufficient is also sufficient to authorize a 
finding on the part of the fact-finding tribunal that it did. But, in 
one way or another, the fact must appear.149 
If heart failure overtakes the employee while he is waiting for a 
bus,150 or an elevator,151 or walking,152 or riding in a car,153 or doing 
routine clerical work,154 there simply may be no strain at all in the 
employment activity which could cause a heart attack. The natural 
progress of the disease may bring the disease to its fatal climax during 
working hours,155 but if the employee's activity at the time involves 
no effort, or effort which cannot medically support a causal connec-
tion, it can rightly be said that the outcome was not causally related 
to the employment. 
149. Hoffman v. National Sur. Corp., 91 Ga. App. 414, 417, 85 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1955); 
see Trippe v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 101 Ga. App. 373, 114 S.E.2d 72 (1960), 
in which a heart attack was held not compensable because merely filling an oil cup 
from a gallon can was insufficient exertion. See also Finch v. Evins Amusement Co., 
80 Ga. App. 457, 56 S.E.2d 489 (1949). 
150. See Ackerman v. H. B. Wiggins Sons, 19 N.J. Misc. 519, 21 A.2d 628 (1941). 
151. Hyshiver v. Hotel Laurelton, 246 App. Div. 660, 283 N.Y.S. 285 (1935); cf. 
C. P. Chaney Sawmill, Inc. v. Robertson, 233 Ark. 711, 348 S.W.2d 703 (1961). 
152. See Harper v. Henry J. Kaiser Constr. Co., 233 Ark. 398, 344 S.W.2d 856 (1961). 
153. See Prejean v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 125 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 1960). 
154. See Union Producing Co. v. Dependents of Simpson, 251 Miss. 183, 168 So. 2d 
808 (1964). 
155. See Tritschler v. Merck&: Co., 66 N.J. Super. 116, 168 A.2d 666 (1961); Black v. 
Mahoney Troast Constr. Co., 65 N.J. Super. 397, 168 A.2d 62 (1961); cf. Wheeler v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 94 Ariz. 199, 382 P.2d 675 (1963); Industrial Comm'n v. Wolfer, 152 
Colo. 205, 381 P.2d 19 (1963); U. S. Steel Corp. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 154 N.E.2d 111 
(1958); Hemker v. Drobney, 253 Iowa 421, 112 N.W .2d 672 (1962); Schuppel v. United 
Van Bus Co., 257 Minn. 444, 102 N.W.2d 24 (1960); Hahne&: Co. v. Guenther, 114 N.J.L. 
571, 178 Atl. 58 (1935); Knight v. Berkline Corp., 210 Tenn. 318, 358 S.W.2d 323 (1962). 
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Proof that employment was not a medical cause of a heart attack 
can be provided in several ways. There may be direct physical evi-
dence, perhaps afforded by an autopsy,156 negating the existence of 
any new heart lesions or pathology.157 There may also be medical 
opinion evidence denying the causal connection. In such cases, 
under familiar rules, an appellate court will not disturb a denial of 
compensation.158 Or the medical testimony on which the claim rests 
may be too speculative or weak to meet the claimant's burden of 
proof.159 In fact, the medical situation may sometimes be impossible 
to analyze. In such a case, if unaided by evidence connecting the 
injury with the employment, the claim may fail.160 
It is difficult enough in the heart cases merely to apply medical 
theory to observed facts, but the difficulty is compounded by the 
persisting cleavage in medical theory itself on the relation of exer-
tion to thrombosis. Cases continue to reach the appellate courts on 
records in which the medical testimony is certain that exertion161 
156. See Burris v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.2d !123, 141 N.E.2d 424 (1957). 
157. See Industrial Comm'n v. Daniels, 124 Colo. 329, 236 P.2d 291 (1951); Goldman 
v. White 8c Case, 9 App. Div. 2d 160, 193 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1959), afj'd, 9 N.Y.2d 763, 174 
N.E.2d 743, 215 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1961). 
158. Chapman v. C. Finkbeiner, 230 Ark. 655, 324 S.W.2d 348 (1959); Rorabaugh v. 
General Mills, Inc., 187 Kan. 363, 356 P.2d 796 (1960); Scott v. Kentland-Elkhorn Coal 
Co., 335 S.W.2d 919 (Ky. App. 1960); Batemarco v. New York Times Co., 9 App. Div. 
2d 569, 189 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1959). Wiederkehr v. Chambless-Rosen Drilling Co., 360 
P.2d 513 (Okla. 1961); Welch v. Schuler Fruit Co., 350 P.2d 604 (Okla. 1960). 
159. See Jones v. Industrial Comm'n, 148 Colo. 253, 365 P.2d 689 (1961); Thiel v. 
Department of Labor 8c Indus., 56 Wash. 2d 259, 352 P.2d 185 (1960). 
160. Fromer v. Stern Bros., 8 App. Div. 2d 868, 186 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1959). 
161. Trudenich v. Marshall, 34 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Wash. 1940); see Chiara v. 
Villa Charlotte Bronte, 273 App. Div. 834, 76 N.Y.S.2d 59, a/]'d, 298 N.Y. 604, 81 N.E.2d 
332 (1948) in which compensation was denied for the heart attack incurred by a janitor 
while carrying 75-pound garbage cans down stairs. This decision, which is out of line 
with the main stream of the New York cases, is explained by the following excerpt: 
The employer's physician said: " ••• physical effort is not the cause of coronary 
sclerosis and coronary sclerosis is the cause of coronary thrombosis, therefore there 
is no causal relation •••• No, effort is not the cause of coronary occlusion, and 
there is no question that the patient had a coronary occlusion; there are cases just 
as often when coronary occlusion occurs, while people are at rest and sometimes 
in bed." 
Id. at 834, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 60. 
Even if, as some doctors often say, coronary thrombosis can just as well occur at 
home in bed, it does not follow that a particular exertion or excitement did not 
contribute to it. See, e.g., Marotte v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 145 Colo. 99, 357 
P.2d 915 (1960), involving a policeman who was "shook-up" in a minor auto accident. 
Two days later, while still feeling "bad", he killed a garter snake for a group of excited 
women. Four days thereafter his own doctor diagnosed his condition as a myocardial 
infarction. The court awarded compensation and held that the fact that an infarction 
could occur while the claimant was at rest did not rebut the evidence that it occurred 
as the result of his employment. See also Bundy v. Concrete Ready-Mb,:: Co., 130 Ind. 
App. 542, 167 N.E.2d 477 (1960), in which the medical expert, when asked whether 
physical strain could have caused the heart condition, testified that the answer was 
much debated. For those people under age 40, strain could be the cause, while, after 
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and emotion162 have nothing to do with coronary thrombosis, while 
most heart cases are based on the opposite theory.163 
However, although medical evidence in a particular case may 
be uncertain or deficient, this will not necessarily bar an award if 
the exertion, taken with other facts, raises a natural inference of 
causal contribution.164 In a recent New York case,165 the medical 
expert admitted that he did not know how a thrombus would occur 
in a normal, healthy blood vessel, or why the thrombosis and infarc-
tion had not occurred previously when the claimant had performed 
much more strenuous labor. Nevertheless, the court affirmed an 
award, saying that "the nonmedical facts thus present a classic case of 
industrial-accident heart attack."166 
This question of the medical relation of exertion to thrombosis 
is something that will have to be left to the doctors. Meanwhile, it 
is up to the lawyers, administrators, and judges who are concerned 
with heart cases in workmen's compensation law to put the legal 
house in order. It is hoped that the solution suggested here may 
help toward that end. 
age 40, perhaps 60% are caused by strain and the others from natural causes. Com-
pensation was denied. See also Fendell v. Industrial Comm'n, 89 Ariz. 180, 359 P.2d 
988 (1961), in which the coronary occlusion of a 69-year-old employee suffered while 
unloading a shipment of 50-pound packages was held causally unrelated to the em-
ployment on the basis of medical testimony that the attack was merely coincidental 
with the strenuous but usual labor. 
162. See Aromando v. Rubin Bros. Drug Sales Co., 47 N.J. Super. 286, 136 A.2d 11 
(1957), in which compensation was awarded although there was a split in the medical 
testimony on whether unusual emotional stress could cause a coronary occlusion. 
163. See Justice Hill's dissent in Chiara v. Villa Charlotte Bronte, 273 App. Div. 834, 
76 N.Y.S.2d 59, affd, 298 N.Y. 604, 81 N.E.2d 332 (1948). 
164. See Thomas v. United States Cas. Co., 106 Ga. App. 441, 127 S.E.2d 169, rev'd, 
218 Ga. 493, 128 S.E.2d 749 (1962); Hoffman v. National Sur. Corp., 91 Ga. App. 414, 
85 S.E.2d 784 (1955). The lower court opinion in Thomas contains an extensive bibliog-
raphy of literature on heart disease and employment. The court in that opinion con-
cluded that an award could not be substantiated upon natural inferences through 
human experience, but the Georgia Supreme Court reinstated the award. 
Natural inferences may also negate a causal connection. See Cole v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 144 Colo. 183, 355 P.2d 537 (1960), in which compensation was denied because 
circumstances tended to disprove any connection between the accident and the throm-
bosis. 
165. Marinaro v. Shapiro, 10 App. Div. 2d 462, 200 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1960), a/f d, 10 
N.Y.2d 910, 179 N.E.2d 520, 223 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1961). 
166. Id. at 462, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 688. 
